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ABSTRACT 
 Recent active shooter incidents and other on-the-job violent encounters have 
caused U.S. fire departments to consider arming their personnel. Since governmental 
bodies and safety agencies have failed to establish firearms-use guidelines within the fire 
sector, many fire service decision-makers have arbitrarily adopted gun carry policies. 
This thesis investigates the most relevant factors such as firearms program costs, gun 
training concerns, and safety agency positions on firearms for the U.S. fire sector to 
consider when establishing firearms programs and employs a comparative options 
analysis methodology. Issues surrounding proper training in gun use and gun storage, the 
lack of safety agency guidance, and conflicting gun policy attitudes are some of the 
crucial elements addressed. This work evaluates the Department of Public Safety (DPS), 
Tactical Fire Team (TFT), and conceal carry programs, which can be leveraged by fire 
stakeholders to make informed decisions as they consider including firearms in their 
operational models. Finally, this study concludes that departments should fashion 
firearms programs in the image of established armed teacher programs, which have 
yielded the most robust safety records and that the National Fire Protection Agency 
(NFPA) should be assigned to set standards for a full suite of safe gun practices. 
Moreover, if properly motivated, the federal government can enact one national firearms 
policy for fire service members. 
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What are the most relevant factors to consider when establishing firearms policies 
within the U.S. fire sector? What are the implications for fire organizations opting to 
implement gun-carry models? Can a Policy Options Analysis offer practical gun policy 
guidance for fire jurisdictions throughout the United States, or does the complexity of gun-
carry models demand tailor-made solutions for individual fire agencies? These three 
questions underpin the research conducted within this thesis.  
Although there is no consensus on whether guns are an appropriate tool for the U.S. 
fire sector, firearms have been used in the U.S. fire service for more than seven decades. 
In recent years, an uptick in the number of fire responses involving hostile actors and a 
steady increase in active shooter events have pushed more departments toward arming 
personnel.1 This research revealed that U.S. fire agencies lack a standard rubric for making 
the critical decision to adopt firearms and provides fire sector stakeholders and 
policymakers a better understanding of critical issues that inform the decisions to embrace 
or eschew guns. 
This discussion is framed by providing a background on the debate over arming 
firefighters. It revealed that although many fire departments have adopted firearms carry 
policies, there is currently a lack of focused literature related to how those departments 
arrived at their decisions to arm personnel. This absence of literature validated the need for 
this research. Since the fire service fails to maintain common standards for taking on and 
maintaining gun programs, a literature review filled that information vacuum with an 
examination of the law enforcement (LE) sector, education sector, safety agency sector, 
and various levels of government and their gun program challenges and concerns.  
 
1. Jennifer A. Taylor and Regan Murray, Mitigation of Occupational Violence to Firefighters and EMS 
Responders (Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Fire Administration, 2017), 28, 55. https://www.usfa.fema.gov/
downloads/pdf/publications/mitigation_of_occupational_violence.pdf. This USFA report acknowledges the 
gap in EMS and firefighter training and equipment, and recommends a “windshield” approach. In 
summary, personnel should remain in their vehicles and call for police backup when violence is expected or 
encountered. Additionally, the report confirms that exposure to violence is a growing problem for fire 
sector emergency responders. 
xvi 
In its examination of gun use in the law enforcement and education sectors, this 
research addressed weapons program concerns such as marksmanship, infrequent gun use, 
weapons security problems, and the dangers of friendly fire and unintentional discharges. 
The study of U.S. police departments revealed a long history of inconsistent performance 
in shooting accuracy, inadequate compliance with safe gun storage practices, and a 
perennial theme of unintentional discharge mishaps. As a general rule, fire agency 
decision-makers should not look to fashion gun carry programs in the image of police law 
enforcement entities.  
Furthermore, this research scrutinized federal, state, and local government roles to 
reveal how these bodies influence the creation of gun policies. The study of government 
shows that although state-level legislators generally drive firearms policies, the federal 
government can establish gun laws when conditions are favorable. The Law Enforcement 
Safety Act (LEOSA) of 2004 serves as evidence that national gun policies are achievable.  
The research also analyzed safety agencies and the ways they impact workplace 
gun policies. Remarkably, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the United States Fire 
Administration (USFA), and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) have 
collectively failed to establish gun safety rules and regulations for U.S. fire department 
workplaces. Safety-agency inertia must be transformed into action to enhance workplace 
safety throughout the fire service. Furthermore, this study of safety organizations 
confirmed that the NFPA has established more than 300 codes and standards for U.S. fire 
departments.2 Therefore, the NFPA is uniquely suited to take on the creation and 
enforcement of gun safety laws for U.S. fire entities. 
Interestingly enough, fire service members may not need guns to accomplish their 
homeland security mission. Upon viewing the figures available from the NFPA for the 
years 2010–2019, there is virtually no indication that acts of violence play any significant 
 
2. “NFPA Overview,” accessed June 13, 2020, National Fire Protection Association (NDPA), 
https://www.nfpa.org/overview. 
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role in the volume of firefighter injuries.3 A careful examination of the relevant data for 
the past decade reveals that firefighter deaths attributable to violence accounted for just 
over 1% of the total firefighter line of duty casualties.4 Even though statistics imply that 
guns are rarely needed, many fire agencies continue to authorize firearms use. Therefore, 
it must suffice to acknowledge the argument against arming firefighters and continue with 
the conversation of how to develop best practices in this arena.  
This work included a Policy Options Analysis of three fire sector gun models and 
three distinct gun carry programs’ merits and drawbacks. The Sunnyvale, California, 
Department of Public Safety; Loveland, Colorado Tactical Fire Teams, and Concealed 
Carry frameworks were chosen for comparison due to their distinctive features and their 
ability to persist. The Department of Public Safety (DPS), Tactical Fire Team, and 
concealed carry models were measured against each other for efficacy across a continuum 
of performance indicators. Program costs, response times, urban versus rural value, gun 
law tie ins, and political implications of these models were compared and contrasted. The 
research illustrated that none of these three models have a universal, clear-cut advantage 
over the others. Instead, stakeholders need to accept that each of these three models is 
inherently flawed to varying degrees. Imperfect as these three gun programs may be, 
however, they should not be overlooked as they provide much-needed perspective for fire 
service decision-makers.  
This research ended with four principal findings. First, fire agencies should follow 
the gun templates used within the education sector for gun training, handling, and storage. 
More than 20 years of unsurpassed safety statistics insist that the education sector has 
developed best firearm practices for an industry composed of traditionally unarmed civil 
servants.  
 
3. Richard Campbell and Joseph Molis, “United States Firefighter Injuries in 2018,” NFPA Journal, 
Nov. 1, 2019, under “Nature and Cause of Fireground Injuries,” https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/
Publications-and-media/NFPA-Journal/2019/November-December-2019/Features/FF-Injuries. 
4. Rita Fahy, Jay Petrillo, and Joseph Molis, Firefighter Fatalities in the United States (Quincy, MA: 
National Fire Protection Association, 2020), https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Data-research-and-
tools/Emergency-Responders/Firefighter-fatalities-in-the-United-States. 
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Second, this work demonstrated that the U.S. federal government can create 
national gun policies for fire sector organizations. Although Congress’ enumerated powers 
generally prohibit its involvement in comprehensive gun legislation, the establishment of 
LEOSA law following 9/11 is proof that stakeholder collaboration across all government 
levels is possible. Politicians, legislators, pundits, and the public should continue to 
contemplate the usefulness of one national gun policy for first responders.  
Another core finding of this research is that national safety agencies have 
completely failed the U.S. fire service. All four of the most respected fire safety 
organizations have withdrawn from gun policy conversations. Despite claims by OSHA, 
NIOSH, the USFA, and the NFPA that firefighter health and safety is of paramount 
importance, none of these entities offers meaningful standards or guidelines for safe gun 
handling, cleaning, storage, or usage within workplaces. The examination of these 
particular agencies concluded that the NFPA is best suited for policy guidance and 
enforcement. To date, the NFPA has created hundreds of standards for the U.S. fire service; 
thus, it is likely that its influence could facilitate the adoption of universal workplace gun 
safety protocols.  
The final key revelation is that semantics can significantly impact the public’s 
perception of gun carry models. DPS of Sunnyvale, California, best exemplifies the 
influence of semantics on civilian attitudes. Research conducted here notes that the 
overwhelming majority of objections to the DPS model revolve around fiscal interests, 
logistical concerns, training obstacles, and frictions over police unions’ and fire unions’ 
conflicting interests. Interestingly, minimal political or public outrage exists over placing 
firearms in the hands of DPS employees. When arming firefighters, organizations should 
consider that a change in agency title could facilitate acceptance of firearms carriage 
models. Similarly, rebranding employees as public safety officers could reduce public 
anxieties that are often attached to the notion of arming firefighters.  
Firearms policies already exist in fire departments located throughout the United 
States, and violent responses and active shooter incidents continue to provoke fire service 
interest in adopting gun carry programs. Although many U.S. citizens oppose firearms 
acquisition for ethical or philosophical reasons, all of us must partake in gun policy 
xix 
deliberations. Fire sector gun program architecture is still relatively new and flexible. 
Those who retreat from involvement in this debate are missing an opportunity to contribute 
to the creation of safer, more robust policies.  
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Civil unrest throughout the United States stemming from the senseless murder of 
George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020, have called into question the legitimacy 
of law enforcement agencies. Since Floyd’s controversial death during an arrest by police, 
Americans may be warming to the idea of defunding the police and reinvesting in other 
public services such as health and education.1 Additionally, negative attitudes toward 
policing coupled with the fiscal effects of COVID-19 on metropolises have already caused 
New York City to eliminate almost $1 billion dollars from the NYPD budget.2 The NYPD 
budget cut could be a harbinger of reductions to police forces across the nation. Any 
reduction in police availability will increase the likelihood of fire service members 
responding to violent scenes without force protection. Furthermore, Ashley Southall and 
Neil MacFarquhar report that there was an increase in gun violence in 64 U.S. cities in 
2020.3 In June alone, there were 125 shootings in New York City, 111 in Minneapolis, and 
100 shot in one weekend in Chicago.4 The national increase in gun violence means fire 
sector service members are responding more frequently to shooting events. The potential 
for decreased police presence paired with increasing gun violence magnifies the relevance 
of debates surrounding firearms in the U.S. fire service. 
Along with police legitimacy, the national discourse on the use of lethal force, most 
often associated with firearms, has also deepened. The limited space available here 
prohibits the careful consideration of all perspectives on the appropriate use of weapons in 
the name of civil service and public protection. Therefore, this research was conducted by 
 
1. Giovanni Russonello, “Have Americans Warmed to Calls to ‘Defund the Police’?” New York Times, 
July 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/politics/polling-defund-the-police.html. 
2. Dana Rubinstein and Jeffery C. Mays, “Nearly $1 Billion Is Shifted from Police in Budget that 
Pleases No One,” New York Times, June 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/nyregion/nypd-
budget.html. 
3. Ashley Southall and Neil MacFarquhar, “Gun Violence Spikes in N.Y.C., Intensifying Debate over 
Policing,” New York Times, June 23, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/nyregion/nyc-shootings-
surge.html. 
4. “Gun Violence Spikes in N.Y.C.” 
2 
applying a traditional view: that firearms are a necessary component of many local, 
regional, and national programs designed to protect the public and those tasked with 
emergency response. Indeed, the Second Amendment grants U.S. citizens the right to keep 
and bear arms. Thus, various civil service agencies can reasonably articulate that firearms 
are necessary to secure safety of all citizens. The discussion of weapons used by police, 
education, and fire agencies herein presupposes those civil servants’ best intentions to 
protect and defend the public. Perhaps Clare Farmer and Richard Evans explain it best: 
armed law enforcement officers (i.e., civil servants) must act within the limits of the law 
and follow the expectations and standards of the communities they serve.5 For the purposes 
of this discussion, it is assumed that armed police, educators, and fire sector service 
personnel act in the spirit of idealized framework described by Farmer and Evans. 
Finally, the exclusion of literature directly related to the national debate on firearms 
and gun violence is intentional. A focus on the merits and flaws of the Second Amendment 
would prohibit a more concentrated discussion on how gun policies might affect fire 
organizations. The reader can and perhaps should consider how civilian gun-carry rights 
factor into this conversation.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
When and under what circumstances firefighters should carry firearms sparks fierce 
debate. Fire organizations encountering events involving violent actors usually delay 
engaging in firefighting and other critical mitigation activities at the scene until armed law 
enforcement arrives.6 These kinds of events include assaults, stabbings, conflicts with 
emotionally disturbed persons, mass casualty incidents, and substance abuse–related 
 
5. Clare Farmer and Richard Evans, “Primed and Ready: Does Arming Police Increase Safety? 
Preliminary Findings,” Violence and Gender 7, no. 2 (July 23, 2019): 47–56, https://doi.org/10.1089/
vio.2019.0020. 
6. Author’s experience and knowledge in part from New York City Fire Department’s internal 
document, “Interagency Response Protocol to Incidents Involving Aggressive Deadly Behavior, Fire 
Tactics and Procedures: Emergency Response Plan Addendum 3a.” 
3 
events.7 As a general rule, fire personnel lack the training and equipment necessary to 
subdue or disarm assailants.8 Therefore, in the interest of first responder safety, fire 
professionals assume a standby position until personnel with adequate tools and 
preparation arrive.  
Despite both civilian and firefighter deaths and injuries, as well as fire operations 
curtailed because of violent actors, the operational framework of the U.S. fire sector 
reflects ambivalence toward firearms use. John K. Murphy, an attorney and expert witness 
on firefighting matters, recently commented on this issue with HGExperts and concluded 
that the problems associated with carrying guns in the fire sector outweigh their potential 
usefulness.9 In the political arena, some public officials, including Virginia Senator 
Jeremey McPike, have voiced similar sentiments. Senator McPike, who is also part-time 
volunteer firefighter, insists that the dangers and liabilities that accompany firearms are too 
great to absorb.10 Nonetheless, on the national level, heightened safety concerns for fire 
personnel and measures taken to address both traditional and non-traditional homeland 
security challenges have led to various jurisdictions proposing—and in some cases 
enacting—legislation to allow fire sector employees to carry firearms.11 
 
7. “Fire Commissioner Nigro Announces ‘Leave Behind’ Naloxone Program,” New York City Fire 
Department, August 31, 2018, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/fdny/news/fa7218/fire-commissioner-nigro-leave-
behind-naloxone-program. 
8. Jennifer A. Taylor and Regan Murray, Mitigation of Occupational Violence to Firefighters and EMS 
Responders (Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Fire Administration, 2017), 28, 55, https://www.usfa.fema.gov/
downloads/pdf/publications/mitigation_of_occupational_violence.pdf. This NFPA report acknowledges the 
gap in EMS and firefighter training and equipment and recommends a “windshield” approach. In summary, 
personnel should remain in their vehicles and call for police backup when violence is expected or 
encountered. 
9. John K. Murphy, “Firefighters Carrying Guns on the Job,” HGExperts, accessed February 20, 2020, 
https://www.hgexperts.com/expert-witness-articles/firefighters-carrying-guns-on-the-job-29792. Murphy 
has worked for more than 30 years as a first responder. He possesses a wealth of knowledge regarding fire 
and medical-related emergencies. 
10. Laura Vozzella, “Virginia Senate Passes Bill Allowing Firefighters and EMTs to Carry Weapons,” 
Washington Post, January 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-
senate-passes-bill-allowing-firefighters-and-emts-to-carry-weapons/2019/01/22/56ed8012-1e8e-11e9-
9145-3f74070bbdb9_story.html. 
11. “Current Events/Issues Affecting the Fire and Emergency Services,” U.S. Fire Administration, 
October 8, 2019, https://www.usfa.fema.gov/current_events/index.html. This source identifies several 
current traditional and non-traditional threats to first responders, including violence. 
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Three U.S. agencies tasked with promoting a safer work environment for 
firefighters include the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the 
National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA), and the National Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH).12 To date, these organizations all have declined to promote firearm 
use to protect fire service personnel. At the same time, all three agencies have failed to 
wholly reject firearms use. Lacking the guidance of these leading fire safety agencies, fire 
organizations across the nation have been forced to fend for themselves regarding how to 
consider the use of firearms.  
To some, firearms appear to be an increasingly necessary tool for fire service 
workers throughout the United States.13 However, many others maintain that firearms 
should remain outside the purview of fire personnel.14 Further complicating matters, any 
number of social, political, and legal factors may lead to increased adoption of gun-carry 
policies by fire organizations across the nation. To enable stakeholders to make well-
informed firearm policy decisions requires establishing standards for gun use in the U.S. 
fire sector. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What are the most relevant factors to consider when establishing firearms policies 
within the U.S. fire sector? What are the implications for fire organizations opting to 
implement gun-carry models? Can a policy options analysis offer practical gun policy 
 
12.“OSHA Revises Publication to Protect the Safety of Firefighters,” Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), September 17, 2015, https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/trade/09172015; 
“The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and 
Prevention Program,” Centers for Disease Control, November 22, 2019, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
default.html. 
13. Mark McGregor, “Bethel Firefighters Carrying Weapons: Clark County Department Could Be First 
in Ohio to Allow Concealed Carry on Runs,” Dayton Daily News, April 14, 2013, 
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/bethel-firefighters-carrying-weapons/
mYQnWYI4q3cEPwtaS8kJiK/. Fire and EMS Department Chief Jacob King explains that firefighters 
taken hostage in Bethel, Ohio, and others ambushed in Webster, NY, led to a unanimous vote for firearms 
use in his jurisdiction. 
14. Frumentarius, “Armed Firefighters and EMTs Are a Bad Idea,” SOFREP, April 3, 2017, 
https://sofrep.com/news/armed-firefighters-and-emts-are-a-bad-idea/; writing for the military news outlet 
SOFREP, under the pseudonym Frumentarius, a former Navy Seal and current firefighter argues against 
arming firefighters. 
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guidance for fire jurisdictions throughout the United States, or does the complexity of gun-
carry models demand tailor-made solutions for individual fire agencies? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many fire organizations throughout the United States have adopted firearms carry 
models in recent years. However, focused literature on this subject is limited. Thus, to form 
a comprehensive understanding of the issue requires examining several intersecting topics 
with the discussion of firearms in the fire sector. An examination of organizations such as 
OSHA, NIOSH, and the NFPA, which set U.S. fire sector workplace safety standards; 
political debates over firearms; law enforcement’s relationship with guns; proposed hybrid 
models; and national gun violence concerns reveals that a consensus has not been reached 
on how to approach the convoluted problem of firearms in the fire sector.  
1. Overlapping Concerns within the Law Enforcement Community  
The relationship between law enforcement and firearm policies is a richly 
documented area that can help provide context to this exploration. For example, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in its 2018 annual report on national law enforcement 
deaths, revealed that perpetrators used firearms to kill 51 of the 55 victim officers.15 The 
same report indicated that, geographically, officer deaths occurred throughout the United 
States and Puerto Rico, affecting every corner of the nation. Responding to those law 
enforcement deaths, The International Association of Chiefs of Police formal firearms 
policy mission statement stresses that firearms are necessary to safeguard the public and 
those who are tasked with upholding law and order.16 Nonetheless, additional FBI data 
collated by Forbes confirms that possessing a firearm and the requisite training to use it 
 
15. “FBI Releases 2018 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed in the Line of Duty” FBI, May 
6, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2018-statistics-on-law-enforcement-
officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty. 
16. International Association of Chiefs of Police, Firearms Policy Position Statement (Alexandria, 
VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2019), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2019-
05/IACP%20Firearms%20Position%20Paper_2018%20(1).pdf. 
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have failed to reduce the number of armed officers killed in the line of duty for more than 
a decade.17  
Furthermore, training alone fails to protect police officers. Remarkably, an internal 
study by the New York Police Department (NYPD), the largest police department in the 
country, revealed that police officers who regularly trained with their weapons had just an 
18% accuracy rate in hitting their target during a gunfight.18 Researchers Christopher 
Donner and Nicole Popovich verified the NYPD study data. In addition, they explained 
that accuracy statistics in other U.S. cities such as Las Vegas, Philadelphia, Chicago, and 
Dallas have hovered between 20–50% since the 1970s.19 Donner and Popovich also 
caution that accurate numbers may be even lower than reported because police agencies 
often record when perpetrators are struck while withholding the total number of bullets 
discharged.20  
In related work, researchers Harris et al. maintain that law enforcement officers 
struggle with accuracy due to physiological responses that arise from situations that are 
hard to simulate in training.21 Scholar Brandon Male supported Harris et al. by 
demonstrating that heightened stress responses in police officers during simulated 
gunfights lead to lower accuracy rates.22 If this is true for highly trained law enforcement 
officers, how might members of the fire service fare under the immediate threat of 
 
17. Niall McCarthy, “The Number of U.S. Police Officers Killed in the Line of Duty Increased Last 
Year [Infographic],” Forbes, May 8, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/05/08/the-
number-of-u-s-police-officers-killed-in-the-line-of-duty-increased-last-year-infographic/#51a4434f1189. 
18. Maureen Downey, “Cops Face Hard Time Hitting Targets in Gunfights. Can Teachers Do It?,” 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, February 22, 2018,https://www.ajc.com/blog/get-schooled/gunfights-trained-
officers-have-percent-hit-rate-yet-want-arm-teachers/mDBlhDtV6Na4wJVpeu58cM/.  
19. Christopher M. Donner and Nicole Popovich, “Hitting (or Missing) the Mark: An Examination of 
Police Shooting Accuracy in Officer-Involved Shooting Incidents,” Policing: An International Journal 42, 
no. 3 (2019): 474–89, https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-05-2018-0060. 
20. Donner and Popovich, 476. 
21. Kevin R. Harris et al., “‘Gun! Gun! Gun!’: An Exploration of Law Enforcement Officers’ 
Decision-Making and Coping under Stress during Actual Events,” Ergonomics 60, no. 8 (2017): 1112–22, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2016.1260165. 
22. Brandon M. Male, “Stress Response and Performance Changes of Law Enforcement Officers’ 
Marksmanship under Varied Levels of Stress” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 2019), ProQuest. 
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violence? Supplementary literature indicates that the inaccurate discharge of firearms is a 
widespread phenomenon, not unique to law enforcement. This examination of arming 
firefighters includes additional sources that consider the inherent dangers of inconsistent 
marksmanship, particularly that which pertains to public safety personnel.  
Gun security has also proven to be problematic for law enforcement agents. 
According to The Trace, an independent nonprofit journalism outlet dedicated to gun-
related news in the United States, dozens of police department–issued weapons have been 
lost or stolen across the nation due to error or neglect.23 Although Philip Cook’s research 
concluded that there was a very modest connection between stolen guns and violent crimes, 
public concerns linger over the feasibility of safeguarding firearms.24 Contrary to Cook’s 
findings, researchers Hemenway, Azrael, and Miller reported an average of 250,000 
firearm thefts in the U.S. annually.25 Furthermore, the study established a correlation 
between the number of crimes committed with illegal firearms and the volume of stolen 
guns that are available in the black market.  
Finally, law enforcement’s issues with “friendly fire” shooting deaths should be 
considered. In the New York Times, Ali Watkins and Ashley Southhall reported that two 
NYPD officers were killed in 2019 by friendly fire in just seven months.26 Additionally, 
scientific studies conducted by Munnik et al. support the ongoing threat of friendly fire.27 
Thus, any decision to arm firefighters could likely invite one, or perhaps several, of the 
same firearm risks faced by law enforcement agencies. 
 
23. Marsha McLeod and Brian Freskos, “Law Enforcement’s Lost and Stolen Gun Problem,” The 
Trace, November 26, 2018, https://www.thetrace.org/2018/11/lost-and-stolen-police-guns/. 
24. Philip J. Cook, “Gun Theft and Crime,” Journal of Urban Health 95, no. 3 (2018): 305–12, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11524-018-0253-7. 
25. David Hemenway, Deborah Azrael, and Matthew Miller, “Whose Guns Are Stolen? The 
Epidemiology of Gun Theft Victims,” Injury Epidemiology 4, no. 1 (2017): 11, https://doi.org/10.1186/
s40621-017-0109-8. 
26. Ali Watkins and Ashley Southall, “N.Y.P.D. Officer Was Killed by ‘Friendly Fire’ during a 
Struggle with Suspect,” New York Times, September 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/
nyregion/bronx-officer-brian-mulkeen-nypd.html. 
27. Annabelle Munnik et al., “The Quick and the Dead: A Paradigm for Studying Friendly Fire,” 
Applied Ergonomics 84, no. 103032 (April 2020): 1–7, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2019.103032. 
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2. Arming Educators Stirs Comparable Deliberations  
One analogous dialogue involving both the public and policymakers is the national 
debate regarding arming schoolteachers. Reporting for the Buckeye Firearms Association, 
Rob Morse revealed that the state of Ohio now has more than 1,000 school staff members 
trained as armed first responders.28 Furthermore, The Daily Signal, a conservative American 
political news website, confirms that the Faculty/Administrator Safety Training and 
Emergency Response (FASTER) program used to train educators in Ohio has been adopted 
by 11 other states.29 
Despite significant support for the burgeoning FASTER program, it also has drawn 
its share of vocal opponents. Writing for The Atlantic, ex-Marine and current schoolteacher 
Tyler Bonin insists that arming teachers is not a solution to address gun violence in the 
school setting.30 Bonin emphasizes that teachers would be unable to coordinate as teams 
during active shooter scenarios. He also cites an inability to sustain the level of training 
that would be required to maintain both safety and effectiveness during a school shooting 
event. 
3. Hybrid Models 
Researcher Loren Ayres was among the first advocates for combining police and 
fire forces; he explains that “fire emergencies create police emergencies.”31 Additionally, 
he considers whether a “[person] can be found who can master these two professions” (fire 
and police service) and deliver the type of emergency service that is called for in a 
 
28. Rob Morse, “Guns and Bandages- the Changing Face of First Responders,” Buckeye Firearms 
Association, August 28, 2018, https://www.buckeyefirearms.org/guns-and-bandages-changing-face-first-
responders. 
29. Fred Lucas, “How This Ohio Program Trains Teachers in 12 States to Carry Guns,” Daily Signal, 
March 6, 2018, https://www.dailysignal.com/2018/03/06/how-this-ohio-program-trains-teachers-to-carry-
guns/. 
30. Tyler Bonin, “Teachers Are Not Soldiers: A Marine-Turned-Teacher Argues That It’s Impossible 
to Prepare Educators to Effectively Use a Gun in a Crisis,” The Atlantic, March 3, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/03/teachers-are-not-soldiers/554783/. 
31. Loren D. Ayres, “Integration of Police and Fire Services,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, 
and Police Science 47, no. 4 (November 1956): 490, https://doi.org/10.2307/1140440. 
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particular situation.32Ayres’s research illustrates a public service dilemma that has been 
considered for more than 60 years.  
Similar to Ayers, Vinicio Mata in his 2010 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, 
advocates for a hybrid framework, such as the Sunnyvale, California, Department of Public 
Safety (DPS) model.33 Today, the Sunnyvale DPS is the largest fully integrated department 
in the country. Its officers, actively trained in three disciplines of emergency response (fire, 
police, and EMS), can be called upon to provide any one of these services at any given 
time.34 Mata qualifies support for this model by noting that a Department of Public Safety 
Model would be implemented most effectively in organizations with similar needs and 
resources.35 However, Mata also stresses that the potential drawbacks to Sunnyvale’s 
integrated model could discourage many fire sector agencies from considering its use. 
Potential obstacles and considerations identified by Mata include a) the department’s 
unorthodox structure leads to trade-offs in longevity and experience as senior roles are 
often temporary; b) maintaining competency in all three disciplines can be problematic; 
and c) training personnel is very costly due to the necessity of preparing staff to execute 
three distinct roles.36 
However, Cynthia Vargas, another Naval Postgraduate School researcher takes a 
different approach in her argument for an alternative to arming firefighters.37 Vargas 
asserts that arson investigation personnel could help address national active shooter 
incidents. She stresses that arson investigators possess a unique overlap of skill sets, 
namely, an intimate understanding of fire service emergencies and expertise as law 
 
32. Ayres, 492. 
33. Vinicio R. Mata, “The Contribution of Police and Fire Consolidation to the Homeland Security 
Mission” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5400. 
34. “Recruitment and Careers,” City of Sunnyvale, accessed November 1, 2019, 
https://sunnyvale.ca.gov/government/safety/recruitment/default.htm. 
35. Mata, “The Contribution of Police and Fire Consolidation to the Homeland Security Mission,” 32. 
36. Mata, 32. 
37. Cynthia M. Vargas, “Tactical Firefighter Teams: Pivoting Toward the Fire Service’s Evolving 
Homeland Security Mission” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 116, http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/50500. 
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enforcement officers. Vargas stresses that ideally, these cross-trained personnel could be 
leveraged to “respond as either a strike team capable of fire suppression, [as] law 
enforcement [for] rapid deployment to neutralize armed assault, or as a force multiplier to 
augment the efforts of existing rescue task forces during hostile events.” 38 
Despite Vargas’s findings, some of the larger U.S. fire agencies, including the 
FDNY, leverage their fire marshal corps to perform more traditional arson investigation 
related functions (i.e., fire code enforcement and determining the cause and origin of fires). 
FDNY policies exclude fire marshals from both active shooter protocols and task force 
participation.39 Moreover, although New York State Criminal Procedural Law grants 
FDNY fire marshals the full measure of police authority, their official job description 
alludes to the use of firearms only in support of their investigatory and arrest activity related 
to arson and explosions.40 
4. Gun Violence and Statistics 
The Gun Violence Archive (GVA) is a watchdog organization that collates 
information related to the pervasive national mass casualty shooter threat. According to the 
GVA, from 2015 through 2018, no fewer than 335 mass shootings took place nationwide 
in any given year.41 This sustained volume of mass shootings indicates that firefighters 
will continue to be called upon to render assistance at violent incidents as pre-hospital 
 
38. Vargas, 79. 
39. Author’s experience and knowledge in part from New York City Fire Department’s internal 
document, “Interagency Response Protocol to Incidents Involving Aggressive Deadly Behavior, Fire 
Tactics and Procedures: Emergency Response Plan Addendum 3a.” 
40. “Promotion to Fire Marshal (Uniformed): Notice of Examination” Department of Citywide 
Administrative Services, accessed April 23, 2020, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dcas/downloads/pdf/noes/
201404502000.pdf. 
41. “The Six Year Review,” Gun Violence Archive (GVA), accessed November 1, 2019, 
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/. The Gun Violence Archive defines mass shootings as ones in which 
four or more people are killed or injured. 
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medical care is among most fire departments’ primary, if not secondary, service 
responsibility.42 
Finally, any comprehensive analysis of firearms use in the fire service should 
consider data that relates to firefighter injuries and deaths, as these factors have significant 
influence over gun-carry policies. The most notable of these data collection organizations 
are 1) the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), considered the leading national 
information resource for fire-related hazards; 2) the United States Fire Administration 
(USFA), the principal federal agency for national fire data collection, fire research, and fire 
service training; and 3) the International Public Safety Association (IPSA), which 
advocates accurate record-keeping through the use of the National Fire Incident Reporting 
System (NFIRS).43  
Although these agencies have recorded firefighter injuries and deaths attributed to 
violence for decades, the overwhelming majority of their reports indicate that violence as 
a cause of death or injury is more of an aberration than a typical occurrence. Nonetheless, 
in 2019, CNN reported that Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed legislation into law 
allowing firefighters to carry firearms while on duty, joining states such as Kansas and 
Ohio, which already have similar laws in place.44 The news outlet also explained that like-
minded legislation has been proposed in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Virginia.45  
 
42. Monica Eng, “Why Send a Firetruck to Do an Ambulance’s Job?,” National Public Radio, April 
11, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/04/11/523025987/why-send-a-firetruck-to-do-an-
ambulances-job. 
43. “NFPA,” National Fire Protection Association, accessed April 24, 2019, https://www.nfpa.org/; 
Karyl Kinsey and Marty Ahrens, “NFIRS Incident Types: Why Aren’t They Telling a Clearer Story?” 
NFPA, January 2016, https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/
Emergency-responders/osNFIRSIncidentType.ashx?la=en; “Home,” International Public Safety 
Association, accessed June 4, 2020, https://www.joinipsa.org/. The long-standing history of the National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and USFA is presented to verify the legitimacy of both agencies. The 
NFPA is a global self-funded nonprofit organization devoted to eliminating death, injury, property, and 
economic loss due to fire, electrical, and related hazards. NFIRS is the national firefighting industry 
standard for fire incident reports and notoriously inexact.  
44. Amir Vera, “New Law Lets Paramedics in Florida Be Armed in ‘High-Risk Incidents,’” CNN, 
June 10, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/10/us/florida-armed-ems/index.html. 
45. Vera, “New Law Lets Paramedics in Florida Be Armed in ‘High-Risk Incidents.’” 
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Presently, there is no agreement among U.S. policymakers, stakeholders, or 
legislative bodies as to how fire service gun policy decisions should be made. This 
literature is presented as a means of addressing the absence of more specific, dedicated 
sources that should be available to help guide fire agencies as they pursue sensible policies 
for their organizations. The literature selected represents deep wells of research with ties 
to public safety, existing gun-carry models, and ongoing debates over the need for firearms 
in the fire sector. The avenues explored here do not encompass every nuanced aspect of 
this dilemma; however, an examination of these sources should serve as a starting point for 
a thoughtful and relevant analysis meant to promote a deeper understanding of the issue. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
First, an evaluation of the law enforcement and school safety sector relationships 
with firearms will help identify some of the challenges that stem from the creation of 
firearms policies. Some of these issues include accuracy concerns, gun security dilemmas, 
and friendly fire deaths and injuries. Since U.S. law enforcement entities have had a 
relationship with firearms dating back to 1857, a consideration of law enforcement 
concerns will be based on nearly 160 years of experience.46 In contrast, a study of the 
relatively new school safety sector will help to identify emerging problems created by the 
decision to arm teachers, another traditionally unarmed segment of public service 
employees. The exploration of firearm carry policies in schools will focus on costs, safety 
concerns, and the public and political pressures being exerted to either promote or 
denounce the incorporation of firearms into the school setting.  
Next, three options for the U.S. fire sector gun-carry policies will be reviewed to 
illustrate the efficacy of different models in use throughout the country. For example, the 
Fire Rescue Authority in Loveland, Colorado, has been using armed firefighters effectively 
on tactical teams since 2007.47 Also, the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety has 
 
46. “Important Dates in Law Enforcement History,” National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial 
Fund, March 31, 2019, https://nleomf.org/facts-figures/important-dates-in-law-enforcement-history. 
47. “Fire Rescue Services,” Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, accessed August. 24. 2020, 
https://lfra.org/our-services/fire-suppression-operations/fire-suppression-services/. 
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functioned as a fully integrated police, fire, and EMS force since 1950.48 Lastly, recently 
enacted legislation in Texas, Florida, and Kansas now permits firefighters and firefighter/
paramedics to carry concealed firearms. The value of these three models can be inferred 
from their adoption and continued use by many U.S. fire agencies across the nation. 
Overall, these models appear to meet the basic needs of numerous fire organizations and 
the communities they serve. A comparison of the models’ strengths and weaknesses might 
reveal the conditions under which a particular framework may flourish or fail.  
Metrics used to evaluate these models are 1) the financial cost of firearms training, 
procurement, and maintenance; 2) the response times of fire agencies to violent events as 
they relate to patient outcomes; and 3) the measurable challenges of urban departments 
versus those faced by rural communities (i.e., population density, size of response areas, 
resources available such as funding and manpower). The variables selected for 
consideration were chosen due to their relevance to governmental budgets, which impact 
all policy decisions; public demands for rapid intervention at violent events; and an 
understanding that first responder needs may vary greatly in urban versus rural settings 
throughout the country. These criteria are only suggested metrics based on their ties to 
safety issues and their ability to be reasonably quantified. The author concedes that other 
parameters may be useful in future considerations of this topic when used independently 
or in conjunction with those studied here.  
Finally, both stakeholder and decision-maker stances will be studied to provide 
sensible gun policy options for the U.S. population, which has demonstrated inconsistent 
tolerances for gun-carry legislation. The aim of research conducted here might be best 
described by educators Michael Kraft and Scott Furlong, authors of Public Policy: Politics, 
Analysis, and Alternatives.49 The authors explain that “at heart, policy analysis encourages 
deliberate critical thinking about the causes of public problems, the various ways 
 
48. Alexandra Berg, “Sunnyvale: Making Police and Fire Services Interchangeable,” California 
Forward (CA Fwd), January 17, 2013, https://cafwd.org/reporting/entry-new/sunnyvale-making-police-
and-fire-services-interchangeable. 
49. Michael E. Kraft and Scott R. Furlong, Public Policy: Politics, Analysis, and Alternatives, 7th ed. 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2019).  
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government or the private sector might act on them, and/or which policy choices make the 
most sense.”50 Furthermore, in their book A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The 
Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving, educators and authors Eugene Bardach 
and Eric Patashnik stress that policy analysis begins and ends with politics.51 Thus, it is 
logical to include the consideration of political attitudes toward firearms in the fire service 
in any policy analysis. Barring a consensus on one national standard for a firearm carry 
policy, the creation of a comprehensive, iterative evaluation framework for firearms use 
will allow fire organizations to make better-informed decisions regarding the adoption or 
rejection of force protection models 
 
50. Kraft and Furlong, 10. 
51. Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path 
to More Effective Problem Solving, 6th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ press, 2019), xviii. 
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II. COMPARISON OF FIREARMS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND EDUCATION 
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 
This thesis’s primary focus is to consider the most relevant factors that might help 
lead to the creation of sensible firearms policies for fire sector agencies. Searching for gun 
policy templates outside of the U.S. fire service led to comparisons with two civil service 
sectors (law enforcement [LE] and education) that each enjoy unique relationships with 
firearms strategies. A look at U.S. LE firearms protocols offers more than a century and a 
half of history and a wealth of gun-related data. Conversely, recently enacted and emerging 
gun policies in the U.S. education sector are attempting to solve the modern problem of 
school shooting events, most often occurring in the absence of traditional LE entities. An 
analysis of shared concerns and some distinctive issues of these sectors will frame the 
foundation of this discourse. 
1. Law Enforcement Agencies’ Attempt to Standardize Weapons 
Programs 
Any decision to arm firefighters would involve confronting perennial issues that 
have troubled U.S. law enforcement agencies since 1857, when Baltimore, Maryland, 
became the first U.S. city to issue police pistols..52 Among these challenges are accuracy 
concerns, gun security issues, and friendly fire deaths and injuries. The upshot of these 
well-documented problems is that fire agencies can benefit from over 150 years of firearms 
policy revisions and improvements. However, recurrent dialogues about gun policy 
problems suggest that definitive solutions remain elusive. In either case, the exploration of 
firearms in law enforcement can provide a richer context for productive analysis.  
In 1895, then New York City police commissioner and future U.S. President 
Theodore Roosevelt identified inconsistencies in U.S. law enforcement firearms protocols. 
At that time, LE agencies across the country allowed officers to carry a variety of weapons, 
 
52. National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, “Important Dates in Law Enforcement 
History.”  
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and they lacked a uniform manufacturer or caliber. As a result, Roosevelt ordered 4,500 
Colt .32 caliber 6 round revolvers for the NYPD, making the department the first U.S. law 
enforcement agency to standardize weapons and ammunition as a means of improving both 
firearms training and marksmanship.53 By 1900, many large departments had followed 
suit. The first half of the 20th century witnessed the commonplace acceptance of 
homogenized firearms in U.S. law enforcement entities. 
Lt. Colonel (Ret) Mike Wood is an NRA certified LE firearms instructor who 
rejects the notion of standardization of firearms and firearms training.54 Wood contends 
that past common LE standards for gender, height, and weight no longer apply, making 
uniform equipment and training a less sensible approach today.55 In fact, Donald Mihalek, 
the executive director of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, emphasizes 
that half of the nation’s ten largest law enforcement agencies currently allow several on-
duty firearm options for their officers.56 Additionally, Graham Kates reports that the length 
and type of U.S. LE firearms training programs vary greatly, ranging from just ten weeks 
to 36 weeks.57Clearly, U.S. LEOs have not yet agreed upon best practices for firearms 
issuance or training methodologies. 
The preliminary information related to LE agencies indicates that fire agencies will 
have to make some difficult choices if they wish to implement firearms programs. Fire 
organizations will have to decide between the legacy approach to standardized weapons 
and weapons training and a newer format providing an array of firearms and a menu of 
 
53. Scott Dylan, “Police Sidearms: From Past to Present,” Pew Tactical, February 11, 2017, 
https://www.pewpewtactical.com/police-sidearms-past-present/. 
54. Mike Wood, “Why Firearms Standardization Puts Police Officers at Risk,” Police1, October 16, 
2017, https://www.policeone.com/police-products/firearms/training/articles/why-firearms-standardization-
puts-police-officers-at-risk-7VIpYZBAhC62fvtv/. 
55. Wood, “Why Firearms Standardization Puts Police Officers at Risk.” 
56. Donald J. Mihalek, “Police Sidearms: The Handguns of America’s 10 Largest Departments,” 
Tactical Life Gun Magazine: Gun News and Gun Reviews, May 18, 2018, https://www.tactical-life.com/
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Years,” WBTV, June 13, 2020, https://www.wbtv.com/2020/06/13/some-us-police-train-just-few-weeks-
some-countries-they-train-years/. 
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weapons training options. Smaller fire agencies and those with limited financial resources 
will likely have to opt for less expensive firearms outfitting options (i.e., a one model gun 
system). Newer, multi-weapon options programs may prove too complicated and cost-
prohibitive for many departments. Finally, fire sector decision-makers need to consider the 
added expenses associated with broader training programs against potential drawbacks of 
one size fits all firearms programs. Leaner firearms training programs that satisfy budgets 
may lead to sacrifices in accuracy due to mismatches between personnel and either their 
equipment or training. 
2. Firearms Accuracy: Training and Qualification versus Proficiency 
Researchers Gregory Morrison and Bryan Vita contend that for decades after the 
turn of the 19th century, U.S. law enforcement training programs languished as they 
universally focused on training in the use of firearms versus adopting firearms qualification 
standards.58 They stress that the nomenclature (training versus qualification) is more than 
a matter of semantics, insisting that qualification implies a level of rigor and expertise that 
exceeds a mere familiarity with firearms. Varg Freeborn agrees with Morrison and Vita’s 
assertions, yet he adds one caveat—that neither training nor qualification are equivalent to 
actual gun proficiency.59  
Jason Wuestenberg, the executive director of the National Law Enforcement 
Firearm Instructors Association (NLEFIA), further argues that liability concerns have led 
LE agencies to promote the concept of firearms qualifications instead of stressing 
comprehensive weapons competence. Although Michael Charles and Anne Copay 
demonstrated that basic law enforcement marksmanship courses dramatically improve 
shooting accuracy, some critics of LE firearms policies insist that an array of statistics 
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prove otherwise.60 Researchers and firearms experts continue to debate whether 
qualification standards prepare armed personnel for interactions with bad actors. 
There is a general understanding that U.S. LEOs who carry firearms require 
training. Nonetheless, questions remain: Do LE industry labels such as “trained” and 
“qualified,” designed to diminish liability and assuage public fears, cause LE agencies to 
forgo their responsibility to prepare officers for field use of firearms? Are qualification 
goals tantamount to bare minimum standards? Do typical gun range standards translate 
appropriately to life and death firearm encounters? How valid are gun qualifications that 
take place under controlled conditions? What path can fire agencies take to avoid wasting 
resources on inadequate training programs? How can fire agencies set effective training 
policies that will meet or exceed the best law enforcement programs?  
Fire service organizations should identify law enforcement agencies with the most 
reliable training records and firearms discharge statistics. However, this may prove to be 
an arduous task as, Duren Banks reports, there are roughly 18,000 federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies in the United States.61 Banks adds that verifying the actual 
number of departments is nearly impossible because individual departments are often 
found in remote localities.62 Fire sector stakeholders must remember that they can choose 
from a vast number of law enforcement models. Only those departments with exceptional 
reputations and verifiable safety data should be considered for potential use as training 
templates.  
3. Rare Use of Weapons and Missing the Target 
Contrary to persistent television and movie depictions of police protagonists 
discharging firearms with pinpoint accuracy, most LEOs rarely fire a weapon in the line of 
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duty. In a 2017 study, Morin and Mercer reported that although 83% of Americans polled 
believed that all LEOs fire their sidearms at least once in their careers, the actual number 
is just 27%.63 Additionally, on the rare occasions that officers draw their service weapons, 
they often fail to hit their mark. The NYPD reported that their police officers were only 
accurate 18% of the time in gunfights, and this phenomenon is common throughout U.S. 
police departments.64 Jennifer Smith Richards et al. revealed that a six-year study of the 
Chicago Police Department (CPD) demonstrated similar results—roughly a 16% accuracy 
rate.65 Moreover, Donner and Popovich determined that anemic marksmanship has been 
prevalent in the Las Vegas, Philadelphia, and Dallas police departments since the 1970s, 
with an accuracy range of 20–50% for five decades running.66  
Kevin Harris et al. explain that LEOs engaged in gunfights experience 
physiological responses, which typically reduce firearm accuracy rates.67 Brandon Male’s 
research supports Harris et al. and further demonstrates a link between low LEO hit rates 
and amplified stress responses experienced by officers during simulated gunfights.68 
Additionally, David Blake and Edward Cumella stress that LEOs’ memory, reaction times, 
and judgment are adversely impacted by routine lack of sleep associated with irregular shift 
schedules.69 Because of these issues, the U.S. fire service sector decision-makers should 
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consider the perils of both stress and sleep deprivation as they relate to firearm accuracy. 
Police and fire personnel share the burden of unpredictable sleep patterns and the demands 
of emergency response. Moreover, were they armed, fire service professionals would not 
be immune to the myriad physiological stress responses that police cope with during 
officer-involved shooting (OIS) events.  
If only 27% of LEOs fire a weapon just once in their career, how often would 
firefighters be called upon to draw a gun? If LEOs have difficulty controlling physiological 
reactions and hitting targets, how can fire agencies expect personnel to perform any better? 
Fire agencies should not look past this valuable information. Some stakeholders argue that 
even one prevented death is worth the liabilities that come along with carrying sidearms. 
This assertion is debatable and needs to be measured against hard data and scientific 
evidence that demonstrate confirmed problems tied to carrying firearms. 
4. Gun Security Problems 
Gun security is another problem that has plagued law enforcement agents. Scores 
of police department-issued weapons have been lost or stolen across the United States due 
to oversight or blatant negligence.70 Additionally, violent actors have taken weapons from 
armed officers and subsequently used them in the commission of crimes. For example, in 
2018, Police Officer Michael Chesna of the Weymouth Police Department in 
Massachusetts and Police Officer Michael Adam Jobbers-Miller of the Fort Meyers Police 
Department were both murdered with their own firearms after perpetrators took control of 
their weapons.71  
Safe gun storage, inside and outside of the workplace, is yet another factor to 
consider. Although the Protection of Lawful Commerce Act of 2005 prohibits the sale or 
transfer of handguns without a gun storage or safety device, usage of said interventions is 
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unclear beyond the point of sale.72 According to a study conducted by T. Coyne-Beasly 
and R.M. Johnson, more than two-thirds of 200 LEOs surveyed admitted that they did not 
comply with safekeeping standards. Additionally, more than half of the officers believed 
that there should be no requirement for gun locks for stored firearms.73 This information 
is alarming as Giffords Law Center reports that 70–90% of suicides, unintentional 
shootings, and school shootings by youths involve firearms that are accessed either from 
inside the home or inside the homes of friends and relatives.74  
There is a general agreement that gun safes, trigger locks, and cable mechanisms 
can prevent the unauthorized use of firearms. However, these precautions are often met 
with resistance because they hinder access to weapons or impede immediate use. Delays 
in access to personal weapons push many toward unsafe practices.  
Fire service organizations need to plan for the reality of uneven compliance with 
gun storage policies. Furthermore, fire agencies should educate their employees regarding 
suicides, unintentional discharges, and the dangerous mixture of poor storage practices and 
minors in the home. A policy of mandatory firearm storage at gun lockers located within 
fire department facilities could help eliminate the concern for home storage entirely. 
5. Dangers of Friendly Fire and Unintentionally Discharged Weapons 
Another somewhat rare yet recurring tragedy in OISs is the phenomenon of friendly 
fire accidents. Some of these errors lead to injury, while others have led to a loss of lives. 
Watkins and Southall observed that two NYPD officers were killed by friendly fire in 2019 
alone.75 Studies conducted by Munnik et al. support the cause for concern over friendly 
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fire incidents.76 They argue that cognitive overloads that are commonplace at high-stress 
lethal force events impact LEO judgment and add that attempts to be fast on the draw 
increase the chances of friendly fire accidents.  
Friendly fire calamities are not the only burden that comes along with gun 
ownership. According to an FBI 2019 report, nine officers were accidentally shot between 
2015 and 2020.77 Some noted causes of unintentional discharges were firearm cleaning 
mishaps, tactical training mistakes, arrest performance miscues, and unintended shootings 
while on patrol. Unintentional firearm discharges occur throughout the country and appear 
to have no universal causation. 
The responsibilities that come with carrying a gun run broad and deep. Fire service 
organizations cannot ignore the myriad safety implications that come along with gun-carry 
programs. Law enforcement injuries and deaths attributable to firearms continue to occur 
despite office firearms training, and established storage practices. Fire organizations opting 
to arm their firefighters must decide if they have better answers to these perennial problems 
or accept these dangers as the cost of providing what they may judge to be an essential 
service. 
B. FIREARMS IN THE SCHOOL SETTING  
In contrast to the longstanding tradition of armed LEOs in the United States, arming 
teachers on a broad scale is a very new endeavor. Since teachers (like firefighters) are 
traditionally unarmed civil service workers and because policies to arm teachers are new, 
the fire service might identify more closely with educators than they do with LEOs. The 
examination of firearms usage in law enforcement has demonstrated that there is ample 
room for policy improvements. Thus, it is sensible for fire agencies to look beyond law 
enforcement policies and consider how the field of education integrates firearms into the 
workplace.  
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1. History of Guns in School and the Watershed Moment of 2007 
National legislation—namely the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990—makes it 
illegal to possess firearms both inside of schools and within the vicinity of school 
grounds.78 However, this does not apply to those who have conceal carry permits unless 
expressly prohibited by local legislation.79 This loophole creates potential problems for 
LEOs, teachers, and first responders as there is no telling which adults are armed inside a 
school at any given moment. Additionally, many argue that advertising schools as gun-free 
zones emboldens some who might harm students and school staff. In response to the 
hazards created by the concealed carry carve out, more than half of the states in the U.S. 
have passed laws prohibiting concealed carry practices in schools.80 Nonetheless, 24 other 
U.S. states currently allow school districts to authorize individuals to carry firearms.81  
The Gun Free School Zone Act is a double-edged sword because it allows both 
civilians and teachers with conceal carry permits to exercise their constitutional right to 
bear arms in school settings. Currently, there is a nearly even national division between 
those states who find firearms to be an appropriate means of protection in schools and those 
who reject the idea. Fragmented sponsorship of gun programs suggests that fire sector 
agencies hoping to gather public backing for weapons programs may find that support is 
lacking in a majority of the country. Furthermore, even those states that sanction conceal 
carry policies leave the final decisions of weapons legality in the hands of individual school 
districts. Fire agencies hoping to implement firearms programs will likely find that they 
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must gain both state and local backing before moving forward with any plans to arm 
personnel. 
Before 2007, the precise history of armed teachers in the United States is somewhat 
murky. School shooting incidents and violence intervention conversations had been well-
documented since the Columbine, Colorado, massacre of April 20, 1999. However, it was 
not until 2007 that the Harrold Wilbarger County School District of Texas enacted the first 
modern gun policy for armed teachers.82 The impetus for the policy change was a mass 
school shooting just one year earlier at the West Nickel Mines School in Pennsylvania.83 
On October 6, 2006, a one-room Amish schoolhouse became the scene of a mass casualty 
incident (MCI) as five young girls perished at the hands of a lone gunman. Proponents of 
the Wilbarger armed teacher model, including school Wilbarger Superintendent David 
Thweatt, were moved by the mass shooting in Pennsylvania and feared a similar event 
could occur given that they were a 30-minute drive away from their own sheriff’s office.84 
Other high-profile school shootings such as Virginia Tech , Sandy Hook Elementary , and 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School to name just a few, forced further school gun 
safety conversations.85  
Justified public outrage over mass shootings coupled with the fear of victimization 
has led to an expansion of teacher carry policies to more than 20 U.S. states since 2007. 
This growth suggests that there is an emerging public tolerance for arming teachers as a 
means of protecting students. The implication here is that fire agencies might expect similar 
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support for gun policies as long as the public perceives school shootings to be an ongoing 
threat.  
2. Public Divide: Those in Favor and Those Opposed 
Ohio is one state that appears to be in the vanguard of the most popular firearms 
policy for U.S. classrooms. Rob Morse reports that Ohio has trained more than 1,000 
school staff members as armed first responders.86 Fred Lucas affirms Morse’s figures and 
further explains that 11 additional states have embraced Ohio’s Faculty/Administrator 
Safety Training and Emergency Response (FASTER) program.87 It is worth noting that in 
the absence of uniform national gun policies for educators, many school districts seem to 
have quietly agreed to current best practices of their own accord. However, not everyone 
can agree that gun training is a prudent measure. 
Notwithstanding significant support for the prospering FASTER program, those 
opposed to firearms in classrooms insist that arming teachers is a poor decision that may 
have grave consequences. Tyler Bonin, a former Marine and current schoolteacher, 
contends that armed teachers are not a solution to gun violence in educational settings.88 
Bonin stresses that teachers would be unable to coordinate efficiently during active shooter 
incidents. He also doubts that teachers will be able to sustain the training necessary to 
ensure safety and effectiveness during active shooter events. Rogers et al. have deeper 
safety concerns. These include the obvious life hazard guns pose, emotional impacts on the 
students that teachers care for, and the potential for improper firearm storage.89 Finally, 
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New York Governor Andrew Cuomo is another highly visible opponent of gun-carry 
policies for educators. Michael Gold reported that Cuomo publicly denounced proposed 
gun policies, stressing that more weapons will never answer the problem of gun violence.90 
3. School Gun Safety and Security 
Gun safety and security are two critical areas of concern for educators. In 
considering these factors, there is a significant overlap with the previously discussed law 
enforcement sector. Hannah Batsche comments that fears of stolen weapons, accidental 
discharges, and innocent bystander shootings must be addressed before gun programs are 
introduced into the school setting.91 Todd DeMitchell and Christine Rath add that firearms 
affect schools in the following ways: 1) teachers’ roles are altered/compromised by adding 
a security component to their suite of responsibilities; 2) liabilities increase; 3) the presence 
of more guns boosts the probability of mishaps; and 4) determining if an armed adult is a 
friend or foe could prove problematic.92 
Thus far, none of the worst fears expressed by politicians and pundits who condemn 
the use of firearms in schools have come to pass. John Lott has collated national data on 
armed teacher programs, and the results are surprising.93 Since January 2000, there has not 
been one report of someone being wounded or killed between 6 a.m. and midnight in a 
school that allows firearms.94 Additionally, there have been no firearm thefts and only one 
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unintentional discharge (that did not lead to an injury) was noted.95 These figures stand in 
stark contrast to the seemingly regular occurrence of law enforcement mishaps.  
It appears that the education sector is finding success where law enforcement has 
failed. The safety data suggests that fire agencies should emulate education sector practices 
rather than follow law enforcement methodologies. Fire departments hoping to gain 
political and public support for arming personnel will have a smoother path if they can 
demonstrate a commitment to the safest practices. At present, school sector safety plans 
represent the ideal model for the fire service. 
4. Monetary and Intangible Costs of Arming and Training Teachers 
Regardless of arguments based on political leanings (i.e., pro firearm versus anti-
firearm stances or decisions that may be swayed by the emotional nature of mass shootings 
in schools) the economic feasibility of arming teachers must be considered. Yuval 
Rosenberg insists that arming 20% of U.S. teachers (as suggested by President Donald J. 
Trump) could cost as little as $71.8 million for basic training to as much as $718 million 
for the aforementioned FASTER training widely used in Ohio ($1,000 per person).96 
Furthermore, the firearms themselves would cost roughly $360 million ($500 per unit) 
along with other added costs such as ammunition and uncertain insurance fees.97 The initial 
costs do not appear to be unreasonably high, yet there are also intangible factors to be 
debated.  
Teachers play supportive mentorship roles in students’ lives. Mutual trust and 
respect flow naturally from these relationships. To what extent might firearms weaken 
those bonds? Do students view the introduction of weapons into the classroom as a 
supportive measure, or rather do they see it as a breach of trust and a stressful reminder of 
pervasive gun violence in the school settings? DeMitchell and Rath insist that conventional 
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safety policies such as security camera installation, metal detector use, and school safety 
officer presence only lead to increased feelings of insecurity and anxiety among students.98 
Danielle Weatherby concurs with the viewpoints of DeMitchell and Rath but adds that the 
presence of guns cause a loss of focus on education, confusing teachers’ roles by forcing 
them to straddle the line between security and instruction.99 
How then should we interpret the cost of arming firefighters? It appears as though 
the process will come with two price tags. The first is easy to compute: a $500 firearm, a 
$1000 training program, and perhaps an additional $500–$1000 worth of incidental 
expenses per person (ammunition, storage, insurance costs, etc.). The second price tag is 
likely to be exponentially higher. What is the trust of a community worth? How can value 
be placed on the public goodwill firefighters enjoy? Is the increased ability to protect the 
public worth the change in image and operational dynamics? Fire agencies need to answer 
these queries before they move forward with gun policies. 
5. Opting Out: Unwillingness to Participate 
Notwithstanding public debates and safety concerns, perhaps the most overlooked 
detail of teacher gun-carry policies is calculating teachers’ willingness to participate. 
Batsche stresses that a 2018 National Education Association poll of 1,000 educators 
revealed that 82% of teachers would refuse to carry a firearm—even if guns were deemed 
legal and teachers were given the requisite training.100 An enthusiasm for gun policies 
among all civil servants should not be assumed. 
Brian Hupp, an EMS director and former assistant fire chief, claims that firearms 
have no place in prehospital emergency medical care and resists any suggestion that they 
would improve dangerous encounters, including those where armed assailants are 
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present.101 Before fire agencies start to fight for the right to carry firearms, it seems that 
they should consider the level of cooperation that they might expect from their employees.  
C. CONCLUSION 
More than 160 years have passed since the first U.S. police department issued 
official firearms. Nonetheless, the passage of time has not eliminated significant weapons 
issues for law enforcement agents. Experts within the law enforcement community still 
disagree on marksmanship training methods. Additionally, LEOs still argue the merits of 
standard weapons versus personally preferred sidearms. Law enforcement accuracy rates 
remain dismal. There are no universal, mandatory standards for the safe storage of law 
enforcement pistols. Friendly fire deaths and accidental discharges still occur with 
regularity.  
Newer firearm policies within the education sector have proven agile enough to 
sidestep the perennial law enforcement problems of safe gun storage and firearm 
competency. However, U.S. states and individual communities still struggle to wholly 
accept or reject a standard plan for firearms in the school setting. School districts that 
discover local support for guns still face tough budgetary decisions tied to training and 
equipment. Finally, even when states or communities agree that arming teachers is 
appropriate, most teachers resist carrying a firearm while working.  
U.S. fire sector agencies wanting to adopt firearms models will need to contemplate 
the aggregate of challenges faced by both LEOs and armed teachers. Firearms are 
inherently dangerous, and it appears that legislators, pundits, and practitioners cannot 
eliminate all of the hazards associated with firearms possession and use. Fire sector 
stakeholders and decision-makers should build on the established best practices of law 
enforcement and teachers while understanding that there are still both policy and 
operational gaps that need to be addressed. Perhaps the fire sector can find creative and 
practical solutions to gun policies from within rather than looking outside their agencies. 
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III. STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN POLICYMAKING AND 
PROTECTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into three distinct and equally germane segments. It explores 
the connection between fire service firearms policies and various levels of the U.S. 
government. This review of government guidance reveals that individual state authority is 
far more impactful than either federal or local forces. Furthermore, this section shows that 
there is no consensus on whether unified national gun policies for civilians or fire service 
personnel would prove to be a more effective than the current state-driven methodologies. 
Since governmental legislation and the oversight of gun policy development dictate the 
legality and legitimacy of firearms programs, it remains essential to periodically review 
how federal, state, and local governments influence the policymaking process. 
The second section of this chapter examines the way in which relevant safety 
entities guide gun policies in the fire sector. Historically speaking, OSHA, NIOSH, the 
USFA, and the NFPA have all helped to shape fire sector workplace rules and regulations. 
Since safe practices underpin questions of liability, sustainability, and public support for 
gun-carry programs, it is essential to identify one or more agencies that will shoulder the 
responsibility of setting safety protocols for the fire sector. An analysis of the 
aforementioned organizations exposes their collective tendency to abstain from 
contributing to firearm safety conversations. Although the NFPA has been reluctant to lead 
gun-related policy discussions, a review of their history indicates that the organization 
possesses all of the attributes needed to direct future weapons safety policies.  
The third and final section of this chapter acknowledges that firearms may not be 
the optimal solution for fire sector stakeholders who wish to address threats of violence. 
Although the basic premise of this thesis is that many fire agencies have already decided 
to shop for appropriate gun-carry policies, it would be foolish to ignore evidence that 
supports the withholding of guns altogether. An exhaustive study of research that fleshes 
out all of the reasons not to arm fire service members could easily warrant a book of its 
own. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, a brief mention of statistical data related to 
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fire service deaths and injuries caused by violent actors will have to suffice in recognizing 
the argument for abstention.  
B. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE STANCE  
The federal government has little authority to set or influence national gun policies. 
Although Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution defines roughly 30 congressional 
powers including the ability to declare war, establish an army, maintain a navy, and set 
rules governing the armed forces, Congress generally lacks the authority to develop 
national gun-carry policies.102 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
states are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”103 In effect, Congress’ 
enumerated powers prohibit its involvement in comprehensive gun legislation. 
Nonetheless, the federal government has leveraged the framers’ language to gain a toehold 
in firearms policies.  
Congress is empowered by the commerce and taxation clauses of the Constitution, 
which allow for the oversight of interstate commerce (firearms crossing state lines) and the 
collection of taxes related to the manufacture, sale, and transfer of firearms.104 However, 
beyond these exceptions, congressional power wanes. In short, states inherit the right to 
control gun laws simply because that responsibility was not assigned to the federal 
government by the Constitution’s framers. 
Despite its limited influence, Congress does not entirely forfeit participation in gun 
legislation. The introduction of several federal acts dating back to 1934 stands as proof of 
federal involvement in national gun policy (see Table 1).105 It is worth noting that the 
overwhelming majority of the relatively few federal gun acts focus on general safety 
considerations while withholding guidance on explicit details of gun-carry policies. 
 
102. U.S. Const. art. I, S.8 
103. U.S. Const. amend. X  
104. Giffords Law Center, “Federal Powers to Regulate Guns.”  
105. “Key Federal Acts Regulating Firearms,” Giffords Law Center, accessed October 22, 2020, 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/federal-law/other-laws/key-federal-acts-regulating-firearms/. 
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Nonetheless, the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) of 2004 illustrates that 
unified, national gun legislation is possible when federal stakeholders interests align.106 
1. LEOSA Legislation 
The LEOSA Act was introduced in the wake of 9/11 after national concerns over 
terrorist threats led Congress to authorize the carrying of concealed weapons by both active 
and retired law enforcement officers.107 In sum, LEOSA allows current and former LEOs 
to carry firearms across state lines, regardless of individual state gun legislation. Although 
LEOSA was intended to improve homeland security throughout the nation, pushback from 
some states on LEOSA legislation has led to amendments in 2010 and 2013, and a proposed 
revamping of the law via the LEOSA Reform Act of 2019.108  
The LEOSA Reform Act is intended to clarify vague language in the original 
LEOSA Act regarding who fits the definition of a LEO. Furthermore, the document 
attempts to promote uniformity in gun magazine allowances across state lines. 
Disagreements over the interpretation of LEOSA have led states such as Hawaii and New 
Jersey to resist full compliance with the act.109 The friction caused by LEOSA between 
some states and the federal government suggests that any proposal for a national firearm 
standard within fire service would be well contested. 
 
106. LEOSA Reform Act of 2004, Public L. No. 108-277, (2004). https://www.congress.gov/108/
plaws/publ277/PLAW-108publ277.pdf. 
107. Michael Bulzomi, “Legal Digest: Off-Duty Officers and Firearms,” Law Enforcement Bulletin, 
January 1, 2011, https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/legal-digest/legal-digest-off-duty-officers-and-firearms. 
108. Police One Staff, “5 Things to Know about the LEOSA Reform Act,” Police1, March 22, 2019, 
https://www.police1.com/gun-legislation-law-enforcement/articles/5-things-to-know-about-the-leosa-
reform-act-qiLVfTfPpssN24Od/. 
109. Gordon Graham, “Traveling with a Concealed Firearm?,” Lexipol, June 30, 2020, 
https://www.lexipol.com/resources/todays-tips/state-gun-laws-leosa-across-state-lines/. 
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Table 1. Federal Acts Related to Firearms 110 
Year Federal Act General Purpose 
1934 National Firearms Act 
(NFA) 
Taxation of certain classes of firearms 
*EXCLUDES most handguns* 
1938 Federal Firearms Act 
(FFA) 
Established that a federal license is needed to 
sell firearms 
Made it illegal to sell guns to felons 
1968 Gun Control Act 
(GCA) 
Set minimum age for purchase of firearms 
Required serial numbers for firearms 
Expanded exclusionary criteria of FFA 
1986 Firearms Owners 
Protection Act (FOPA) 
Legalized gun show sales within states 
Limited ATF inspections 
Prevented a federal database of firearms owners 
1993 Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention 
Act 
Imposed a five-day waiting period for 
background checks 
1994 Public Safety and 
Recreational Firearms 
Use Act 
Banned semi-automatic assault weapons 
Prohibited large capacity ammunition feeding 
devices  




Officers Safety Act 
Allows active and retired law enforcement 
officers to carry concealed firearms in any 




Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms 
Act (PLCAA) & The 
Child Safety Lock Act 
(CSLA) 
Required gun storage or safety device upon sale 
or transfer of firearms 
 
110. Adapted from Giffords Law Center, “Key Federal Acts Regulating Firearms;” NRA-ILA “Law 
Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA),” accessed July 17, 2020. https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/
leosa/. 
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Year Federal Act General Purpose 






Monetary incentives offered to states willing to 
share personal information of those deemed 
mentally ill or institutionalized for use in the 
background check data bank. 
 
Historical evidence suggests that the federal government will not get involved with 
fire sector gun policies. The Gun Control Act and the Brady Act continue to ensure that 
fire service members are vetted before they can be armed. However, this peripheral federal 
involvement is limited to deciding eligibility to carry a firearm. The federal government 
will not infringe upon state and local authorities decisions to arm firefighters, nor will it 
insist upon any particular standards for firearms platforms. Although LEOSA legislation 
hints at the possibility of a national gun standard for firefighters, stakeholders are still 
arguing its merits. If typically armed LEOs still cannot secure universal support for 
firearms carriage, what is the likelihood that fire service members ever could? For the time 
being, fire sector decision-makers will continue to build firearms programs without specific 
federal guidance.  
2. State Legislative Positions 
In 1788, writing Federalist No. 45, James Madison explained, “the powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. 
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”111 This 
document’s spirit remains intact in the form of individual state firearms legislation that 
governs gun permits, carry laws, sales, and self-defense laws.112 The value of examining 
various state gun laws lies in the opportunity to gain an understanding of 1) how state laws 
 
111. “Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History,” Library of Congress Research 
Guides, accessed July 21, 2020, https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-41-50. 
112. “Gun Laws By State: The Complete Guide,” Guns To Carry, accessed August 30, 2020, 
https://www.gunstocarry.com/gun-laws-state/. 
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may influence gun ownership and use given that fire sector gun policies are created to 
address the threat of armed combatants; and 2) how individual states might implement fire 
sector gun models based on their legislative stances on guns. Individual state laws impact 
handgun accessibility and the number of firearms circulating in a given state. It is likely 
that in some states, either the routine nature of interactions with armed individuals or a 
more pronounced threat of gun violence tied to widespread gun use could lead to greater 
support for arming fire sector personnel. 
The disparity in U.S. state gun policies is witnessed through a comparison of the 
most permissive and restrictive jurisdictions. For example, both Alaska and Arizona allow 
the private sale of guns without background checks, do not require permits for the purchase 
of firearms, and permit open carrying of handguns and long guns.113 Conversely, states 
such as New York, New Jersey, and California require background checks to purchase 
firearms and permits for private sales while prohibiting the open carry option.114 How 
might these inconsistencies inform gun policies for the fire service? 
RAND confirmed that Americans have complex attitudes toward guns.115 Their 
research revealed that citizens disagree on perceived gun policy outcomes more than the 
need for gun policies.116 Some Americans view the presence of guns as a symbol of 
violence, while others perceive guns as a tool used to provide security and safety. For 
example, scores of new gun laws have been enacted by state legislatures since the Parkland, 
Florida, shooting of 2018. The Associated Press and Steve Contorno reported that some 
states like Iowa, Louisiana, and Ohio have expanded some gun rights while Vermont, 
 
113. Guns To Carry, “Gun Laws by State.” 
114. Guns To Carry, “Gun Laws by State.” 
115. “Gun Policy in America: An Overview,” RAND, last modified April 22, 2020, 
https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/key-findings/gun-policy-in-america.html. 
116. RAND, “Gun Policy in America.” 
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Washington, and Connecticut have diluted others.117 This seemingly schizophrenic flurry 
of legislation is a classic example of the difficulty in setting national gun frameworks. 
The wide array of gun legislation from state to state suggests that fire agencies may 
want to continue constructing proprietary gun-carry programs rather than waiting to adopt 
a universal model that may never come to pass. The outlook on domestic gun policy 
partnerships remains bleak. Nevertheless, all U.S. states are mandated to comply with 
federal gun acts. This reality establishes that cooperation and coordination across the nation 
regarding gun policies is possible. Perhaps, then, it is time for states to consider the 
feasibility of synchronizing legislation and enforcement of all matters related to firearms. 
3. Federal Firearms Legislation 
Giffords Law Center explains that the preemption of gun laws “occurs when a 
higher level of government removes regulatory power from a lower level of 
government.”118 The national discourse on preemption emerged in 1981 after the city of 
Morton Grove, Illinois, instituted a handgun ban.119 The National Rifle Association (NRA) 
disputed the ban and rallied state-based gun rights advocates in Illinois to fight the measure. 
The town of Morton Grove was able to resist preemption for 27 years until the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in District of Columbia versus Heller.120 In 2008, the Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled 5–4 in favor of protecting the Second Amendment rights of citizens to 
keep and bear firearms. Shortly thereafter, Morton Grove conceded defeat and repealed 
their handgun ban.121  
 
117. Associated Press and Steve Contorno, “Here Is Every New Gun Law in the U.S. since the 
Parkland Shooting,” Tampa Bay Times, February 13, 2019, https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/
buzz/2019/02/13/here-is-every-new-gun-law-in-the-us-since-the-parkland-shooting/. 
118. “Preemption of Local Laws,” Giffords Law Center, accessed October 12, 2020, 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/preemption-of-local-laws/. 
119. Jennifer Mascia, “In Much of the Country, Cities Can’t Enact Their Own Gun Laws,” The Trace, 
December 8, 2018, https://www.thetrace.org/2018/12/preemption-nra-local-gun-laws/. 
120. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/
554/570/. 
121. Robert Channick, “Morton Grove’s Landmark Gun Prohibition Is Repealed,” Chicago Tribune, 
July 29, 2008, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2008-07-29-0807280686-story.html. 
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The SCOTUS ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller, has been bolstered by 
additional, local legislative ordinances throughout the country. Jennifer Mascia reports that 
currently, 44 states have preemption laws "prohibiting local governments from enacting 
gun regulations that are stricter than those passed by state legislators."122 However, not all 
local legislators are content to cede gun policy authority to the states. Mayor Bill Peduto is 
one city leader who successfully pressed his city council to pass stricter gun laws following 
a 2018 mass shooting in Pittsburgh.123 Nonetheless, his action and subsequent call for 
support from mayors throughout the country may not find traction as the city council 
decision has already prompted lawsuits by the NRA.124  
Recently, a similar yet even more aggressive action to repeal preemption laws took 
root in Illinois. However, the NRA has called for resistance to the measure insisting that 
preemption laws are an essential protection against the weakening of Second Amendment 
rights.125 The NRA further argues that allowing individual cities to enact gun legislation 
will lead to a confusing assortment of gun laws making compliance more difficult.  
The implications for the fire sector here are twofold. First, firearms ownership will 
continue to pose a threat at the local level. Second, firearms policies for the fire sector must 
remain a consideration as long as the danger of engaging with armed perpetrators exists. 
For nearly four decades, state preemption laws have proven to be too powerful for smaller 
governments to overcome. If cities are unable to enact legislation to ban firearms use, it 
might be beneficial for them to put more resources into well-designed gun policies and 
programs that can adequately address gun violence threats.  
 
122. Mascia, “In Much of the Country, Cities Can’t Enact Their Own Gun Laws.” 
123. Mascia, “In Much of the Country, Cities Can’t Enact Their Own Gun Laws.” 
124. J. Dale Shoemaker, “Pittsburgh City Council Passes Landmark Gun Legislation. NRA 
Prematurely Said It Filed Suit,” PublicSource, April 2, 2019, https://www.publicsource.org/pittsburgh-city-
council-passes-landmark-gun-legislation-nra-promptly-files-suit/. 
125. “Illinois: Senate Attempts to Repeal Preemption Law,” NRA-ILA, accessed July 24, 2020, 
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20180314/illinois-senate-attempts-to-repeal-preemption-law. 
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C. SAFETY AGENCY STANCES 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 2011 and 2018, an annual 
average of 350 victims died as a result of firearms violence in workplaces across the United 
States.126 Thus, gun control advocates assert that loaded firearms pose an immediate threat 
to human health and safety within workplace settings.127 Additionally, the nonprofit 
organization Brady United reports that more than 110,000 U.S. citizens are shot 
annually.128 Given that fire service members typically respond to these gunshot 
emergencies in order to provide prehospital medical care, it appears that fire sector 
personnel are exposed to workplace gun violence at a much greater rate than the general 
population. However, in spite of alarming firearm-related violence data, guidance on gun 
safety for U.S. fire service programs is generally lacking. An examination of some leading 
fire safety organizations might indicate which agency or agencies should take the lead in 
establishing gun safety standards for the fire service. Since time and space limitations 
prohibit the examination of all safety entities, the focus will remain on a handful of the 
most prominent examples. Ironically, the NRA provides gun safety guidelines free of 
charge to the public.129 Will safety agencies that share relationships with the fire service 
offer similar strategies for the fire sector? If not, then why not?  
 
126. “National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2018,” U.S. Department of Labor, accessed 
September 2, 2020, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
cfoi_12172019.pdf#:~:text=NATIONAL%20CENSUS%20OF%20FATAL%20OCCUPATIONAL%20INJ
URIES%20IN%202018.,reported%20today.%20%28See%20chart%201%20and%20table%201.%29. 
127. “Statement: Gabrielle Giffords Responds to 3 Workplace Shootings in 24 Hours,” Giffords 
Courage to Fight Gun Violence, September 20, 2018. https://giffords.org/press-release/2018/09/workplace-
shootings/. Gabrielle Giffords is a former U.S. Representative from the state of Arizona. Giffords became a 
fervent gun control advocate after being shot in the head during a constituent meeting in 2011. Here, she 
issues an anti-firearms statement following three shootings in workplaces across the U.S. within just 24 
hours. “APA’s Advocacy on Gun Violence Prevention,” American Psychological Association, accessed 
August 15, 2020, https://www.apa.org/advocacy/gun-violence.The American Psychological Association 
(APA) has launched a campaign to reduce gun violence across the nation, including those shootings that 
occur in the workplace.  
128. “Key Statistics,” Brady United, accessed July 25, 2020, https://www.bradyunited.org/key-
statistics. 
129. “NRA Gun Safety Rules,” NRA Explore, accessed July 17, 2020, https://gunsafetyrules.nra.org/. 
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1. Occupational Safety and Health Administration  
The Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970 led to the creation of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).130 At that time, the United States 
Congress determined that that the cost of work-related injuries was simply too high for 
U.S. taxpayers to bear. Thus, OSHA was established in an attempt to promote safe 
workspaces and mitigate workplace injuries. Reflecting prior justification for involvement 
in national gun policy, the federal government again cited both interstate commerce 
oversight and improved tax revenues as reasons to intervene in workplaces across the 
country.131 In sum, the OSH Act provided a framework that insisted on federal 
involvement in policy that was broad yet not all-encompassing.  
OSHA concerns run the gamut from slip and fall protection to machinery and 
machine guarding to eye and face protection in work settings.132 To its credit, the 
organization boasts that worker deaths dropped from an average of 38 a day in 1970 to an 
average of 14 a day in 2018.133 Additionally, the organization stresses that there are 
significantly lower rates of workplace injury since its inception. Although some data 
appears favorable, not all OSHA statistics reflect well upon the organization. One glaring 
example is the number of recorded instances of gun violence.  
According to OSHA’s statistics, there were 458 workplace homicides in the U.S. 
in 2017.134 Doucette et al. support that number and further explain that 351 of those 
homicides were committed with firearms.135 Furthermore, Kamika Shaw reported that 
 
130.“OSH Act of 1970,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration,” December 29, 1970, 
https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/oshact/completeoshact.  
131. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, “OSH Act of 1970,” sec. 2(a). 
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134. “Workplace Violence,” U.S. Department of Labor, accessed September 2, 2020, 
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135. Mitchell Doucette, Cassandra Crifasi, and Shannon Frattaroli, “Right-to-Carry Laws and Firearm 
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when pressed to take a stand against firearms in the workplace, OSHA refused.136 
Paradoxically, both OSHA and its parent entity, the Department of Labor, insist on policies 
that prohibit general workplace violence while ignoring the more specific gun violence 
problem.  
It is unclear why OSHA will not weigh in on gun policies in the workplace. Indeed, 
the lack of OSHA firearms oversight has led to less restrictive workplace gun laws. In 
2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of “parking lot laws,” 
which allow employees to keep firearms in their vehicles while at work.137 The Appellate 
Court specifically cited a lack of OSHA regulations banning the practice as the justification 
for the ruling.138 Based on that judgment, 26 states now offer varying levels of protection 
for employees who wish to store firearms in their vehicles on company property.139 More 
than 15 years have passed since parking lot laws were introduced. OSHA continues to 
abstain from involvement in gun-related matters.  
Nearly 50 years have passed since President Richard Nixon endorsed the creation 
of OSHA. The organization has shown that it can effectively reduce workplace injuries and 
deaths through legislation, education, and workplace visits. Nonetheless, fire agencies will 
not be guided by OSHA firearm safety policies for the foreseeable future. Instead, the fire 
sector will have to create and maintain in-house firearms safety policies until OSHA or 
another recognized safety agency decides that intervention is appropriate.140 
 
136. Kamika S. Shaw, “Regulating Guns in the Workplace,” OnLabor (blog), March 29, 2017, 
https://www.onlabor.org/regulating-guns-in-the-workplace/. 
137. Eddie Sorrells, “Weapons in the Workplace,” Security Management, March 1, 2018, 
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138. Sorrells, “Weapons in the Workplace.” 
139. David Sparkman, “Can You Keep Guns Out of Your Workplace?,” EHS Today, January 7, 2019, 
https://www.ehstoday.com/environment/article/21919948/can-you-keep-guns-out-of-your-workplace. 
140. A direct question was submitted to OSHA’s query application via OSHA.com in March 2019 
regarding the agency’s position on firearms. The reply, which was not attributable to any particular OSHA 
employee, simply stated that gun safety issues are beyond the organizations purview. No further 
explanation was offered. 
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2. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health  
As noted previously, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), like OSHA, was created by the OSH Act of 1970. Whereas OSHA is tasked with 
actual enforcement of policies and can levy fines, NIOSH’s role is to make 
recommendations based on research related to the prevention of workplace injuries. Unlike 
OSHA, which works under the U.S. Department of Labor, NIOSH’s budget falls under the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).141 NIOSH’s place beneath the CDC 
umbrella may explain why the agency has not initiated firearms research that could benefit 
the fire sector. 
In 1993, the CDC published a report that demonstrated homes with guns were more 
dangerous than homes without weapons.142 In response to the research, the NRA lobbied 
Congress to pass the Dickey Amendment sponsored by Arkansas Congressman Jay 
Dickey. The amendment was attached to the 1996 U.S. Federal Omnibus Spending Bill.143 
The legislation states that CDC funds may not be used to fund research that would 
“advocate or promote gun control.”144 For more than two decades, the CDC’s Injury 
Prevention Center has steered clear of gun violence-related research. Fear of violating the 
Dickey Amendment’s spirit, coupled with concerns about defunding, has had a chilling 
effect on would-be researchers. Laura Wexler confirms the shortage of CDC gun violence 
data, research, and expertise.145 Gun policy researcher Cassandra Crifasi concurs and 
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10.2105/AJPH.2018.304450. 
144. Laura Wexler, “Gun Shy: How the Dickey Amendment Affects Gun Violence in America” 
Hopkins Bloomberg Public Health Magazine, Fall 2017. https://magazine.jhsph.edu/2017/fall/features/
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maintains that there are possibly as few as 30 gun-policy experts in the country due to a 
universal lack of funding for gun-related research programs.146 
Presently, NIOSH is in no position to inform gun safety policies for the fire sector. 
As long as the CDC limits funding toward gun violence research, NIOSH will be unable 
to explore potential solutions to firearm safety concerns. At best, in the absence of sound 
data, NIOSH would be forced to make educated guesses to determine safety protocols. 
Furthermore, even if the Dickey Amendment were to be repealed, NIOSH is an agency that 
merely makes recommendations. Without the teeth of enforcement power behind policy 
frameworks, NIOSH would be unable to guarantee safety compliance from fire agencies. 
3. United States Fire Administration 
The Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (FPCA) established the 
National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, which is known today as the United 
States Fire Administration (USFA).147 The agency operates as a subdivision of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).148 The organization’s mission statement explains that their goal “is to support 
and strengthen fire and emergency medical services (EMS) and stakeholders to prepare for, 
prevent, mitigate, and respond to all hazards.”149  
Though the USFA’s mission statement suggests that it would be well suited to 
weighing in on U.S. firearms policies, a closer look at the FPCA reveals some conflicting 
ideals. Section 7. 1 (a-f) of the FPCA not only directs that the USFA involve itself in 
tactical and command training of U.S. fire service personnel it also leaves room for 
expansion of its responsibilities. However, Section 2. 11 of the same document explains 
that the USFA was created to “support and reinforce the activities of state and local 
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government” rather than dictate policies. Due to the ambiguous language of the FPCA, the 
USFA appears to have some latitude in how it may choose to influence gun-carry policies. 
Semantics aside, actions often speak louder than words, and it is essential to 
contextualize the USFA’s voice in this conversation against the agency’s body of work. 
Although the USFA, like OSHA, promotes fire sector safety in general, the agency has no 
formal stance on firearms. Furthermore, unsurprisingly, most USFA resources are geared 
toward training, education, and data collection in fire-related matters.150 Gun violence and 
fire sector gun programs do not appear to be a priority for the agency. The magazine 
Government Technology supported this notion stressing that the USFA’s top priorities are 
better data collection, expanding fire training and education, and funding fire-related 
research.151  
The USFA is not the appropriate organization to establish fire service gun policies. 
Although the loosely worded language in the FPCA might allow the agency to offer 
direction in the matter, the organization’s track record demonstrates a lack of interest and 
inertia regarding firearms standards. Additionally, the USFA is strongly committed to 
mitigating fire-related losses of life and property to the exclusion of other causes. 
Furthermore, given the agency works with a budget of less than $50 million, it is unlikely 
that it would be able to dedicate ample resources toward the endeavor.152  
4. The NFPA and Active Shooter Hostile Environment Response 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is considered the leading national 
information resource for fire-related hazards.153 Founded in 1896, the NFPA has 
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established more than 300 codes and standards for U.S. fire departments.154 The bulk of 
NFPA standards are related to fire and electrical hazards. However, the NFPA’s role as a 
safety watchdog occasionally leads to its involvement in policies that reach beyond routine 
fire operations.  
In 2018, Industrial Safety and Hygiene News reported that the NFPA’s Standards 
Council opted to abbreviate its typical timeline for standard development to address the 
national threat of active shooters. Mass shootings such as the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, 
Florida, Mandalay Bay in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the church shooting in Sutherland, 
Texas, prompted the call to action. The result of the effort to unify emergency personnel 
response and mitigate risk is the NFPA 3000 standard for Active Shooter Hostile 
Environment Response (ASHER).155 The urgent need for active shooter policy is 
supported by Hart, who reported that between 2000–2018 there were 277 active shooter 
events in the U.S., resulting in 2,430 casualties.156  
The facts above raise an important question. If the NFPA was able to coordinate 
and expedite the creation of the ASHER standard so quickly, then why have they not shown 
any inclination to direct firearms use in the fire sector? In creating the ASHER standard, 
the NFPA has indeed involved itself in establishing gun-related protocols. Why then has 
the NFPA stopped short of suggesting best practices for firearms in the fire sector? A closer 
look at fire sector violence data may provide the answer. 
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D. FIRE SECTOR VIOLENCE MAY INDICATE THAT GUNS ARE NOT 
NEEDED 
1. Injury Data  
The NFPA has only been analyzing statistics on firefighter injuries and deaths since 
1981.157 Similarly, the United States Fire Administration (USFA), the principal federal 
agency for national fire data collection, public fire education, fire research, and fire service 
training, failed to maintain valid data on fire service injuries or deaths by violent actors 
prior to 1990.158 Therefore, we can say that the study of firefighter injuries and deaths is a 
relatively new endeavor. Consequently, we will glean what we can from the most recent 
information available. 
Upon viewing the figures currently available from the NFPA for years 2010–2019, 
there is virtually no indication that acts of violence play any significant role in the volume 
of firefighter injuries.159 USFA data for the same period gathered from the National Fire 
Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) supports the NFPA’s findings.160 According to the 
NFPA’s accounting, the most consistently reported firefighter injuries are caused by 
thermal burns, smoke inhalation, falls, and strains or sprains.161 Furthermore, NFPA’s 
statistical charts for 2010–2019 do not indicate that violence-related fire sector injuries are 
a common concern. Also, for the same period, the NFPA does not mention addressing 
violence as a consideration in reducing firefighter injuries as it does for other noted causes 
of trauma in its evaluative reports for the same period. This is not to suggest that many 
working in the fire service do not operate in hostile or potentially hostile environments. 
Instead, it implies that exposure to said environments seldom leads to injury. 
 
157. Richard Campbell and Joseph Molis, “Firefighter Injuries Report in 2018,” NFPA Journal 
Magazine, November 1, 2019. http://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Publications-and-media/NFPA-
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158. U.S. Fire Administration, “About the U.S. Fire Administration.” 
159. Campbell and Molis, “Firefighter Injuries Report in 2018.” 
160. “National Fire Incident Reporting System,” U.S. Fire Administration, July 22, 2020, 
https://www.usfa.fema.gov/data/nfirs/index.html. 
161. “Firefighter Injuries in the United States,” National Fire Prevention Association, accessed 
November 1, 2019, https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Data-research-and-tools/Emergency-
Responders/Firefighter-injuries-in-the-United-States. Most recent data available from 2007–2018.  
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2. Firefighter Deaths Are Rarely Linked to Violence 
In addition to recording firefighter injury data, the NFPA also tracks firefighter 
death-related statistics. A careful examination of the relevant data for the last decade 
reveals that firefighter deaths attributable to violence accounted for just over 1% of the 
total firefighter line of duty casualties.162 Additionally, the most recent NFPA data 
indicates that nationally, firefighters responded to an average of over 34 million calls for 
assistance between 2010 and 2019.163 The relatively low number of firefighters killed by 
gun violence in proportion to the number of emergency responses presents a compelling 
argument against a need for firearms in the fire service. Nonetheless, on June 9, 2020, 
Texas firefighter Klayton Manning was killed while on duty by a lone gunman.164 
Although Manning’s death is tragic, NFPA statistics show that, on average, only one 
firefighter per year dies in the United States due to an act of violence.165  
The data collected suggests that both the USFA and NFPA might resist the idea of 
recommending gun safety protocols for the fire industry. Likely, the two safety agencies 
do not find current statistical evidence compelling enough to warrant arming firefighters. 
Indeed, arming firefighters may be a disproportionate reaction to abject violence rather 
than what amounts to be an aberration from a statistical perspective. However, the alarming 
trend of increased mass shooting incidents from 2013–2018 caused the NFPA to take 
extraordinary measures to create the NFPA 3000 standard.166  
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2018/02/15/us/school-shootings-sandy-hook-parkland.html. 
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After spearheading ASHER, the NFPA’s decision to withhold guidance for fire 
sector gun policies seems counterintuitive. The NFPA has proven that it can gather support 
for national policies and install them in a timely fashion; therefore, the NFPA may be the 
only safety agency ideally positioned to create national fire sector gun policies. How or 
when the NFPA might choose to get involved in setting gun program standards remains up 
to the agency itself. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Constitution, commonplace state conceal carry legislation, and parking 
lot laws afford most citizens the right to carry firearms. Despite some individual state 
restrictions on gun use, federal laws presently favor firearms possession for those citizens 
who choose to exercise their Second Amendment rights. As long as a substantial portion 
of the U.S. population can procure firearms, the fire sector must consider how they will 
address the ongoing threat of gun violence.  
Since the U.S. Constitution dampens federal authority on firearms and the NRA has 
proven to be highly effective in defeating local attempts at establishing gun legislation, 
individual state governments will continue to dictate the terms for gun use in the fire sector. 
Nonetheless, the possibility remains that federal laws will be adjusted to demand universal 
participation in a new fire sector–related firearms act. Indeed, the creation of LEOSA has 
already expanded gun-carry rights for both active and retired U.S. law agents. However, 
federal coordination is unlikely due to myriad systemic hurdles previously discussed. It 
then follows that individual states must decide if they are comfortable with ownership of 
fire service firearms protocols. Unless an overwhelming majority of states come together 
and demand federal intervention to create one national firearms policy, the future of firearm 
legislation will continue to resemble its past.  
OSHA has proven to be successful in reducing workplace violence and deaths. 
Nonetheless, the organization has also demonstrated ambivalence on workplace violence 
matters. OSHA is a vocal opponent of violence but withholds a formal opinion on firearms. 
Simply put, the agency has refused to make meaningful contributions to the conversation 
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of guns in the workplace. For the moment, OSHA will not provide answers to tough gun 
policy questions. 
NIOSH, OSHA’s sister agency, is also incapable of directing firearms programs. 
The agency remains hamstrung by the Dickey Amendment. NIOSH will be of no use in 
creating firearms frameworks until it can resume gun violence research with impunity. 
Additionally, NIOSH lacks the critical enforcement authority that must accompany 
effective policy-making. If NIOSH is not allowed to administer penalties for non-
compliance, then policy creation and oversight may be more appropriately tasked to an 
agency that can wield that power. 
The USFA, by its own admission, is primarily a data gathering and analysis 
entity.167 The USFA is the fire sector’s quintessential intelligence agency, and it should 
continue to play to that strength. Additionally, the organization can be useful in helping to 
educate the public and by suggesting improvements in emerging firearms programs. These 
are the agency’s core competencies that can be leveraged to support armed fire agencies. 
In summary, the USFA is best suited to evaluating the efficacy of fire service gun programs 
rather than establishing them.  
Finally, the NFPA is a fire sector agency that does show some promise. The NFPA 
has helped to guide fire service policies for more than 120 years. Fire sector agencies are 
well-accustomed to having standards and codes established through the organization. The 
ratification of gun-carry policies via the NFPA would all but guarantee acceptance and 
compliance from fire departments throughout the nation. Through the establishment of the 
NFPA 3000 ASHER standard, the NFPA has proven that it can rapidly harness 
commitment and cooperation from various agencies and set a universal weapons-related 
model. Therefore, the NFPA would be the ideal organization to decide upon best practices 
for firearms use by fire sector personnel. 
Taking these various considerations together, it may be that the wisest and most 
economical course of action for fire sector decision-makers is to step away from gun 
 
167. “U.S. Fire Statistics,” U.S. Fire Administration, accessed April 16, 2020, 
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procurement models altogether. In fact, opting out of gun-carry policies is still the rule 
rather than the exception among U.S. fire organizations. Undeniably, the analysis of data 
gathered by the NFPA, and USFA confirms that firefighter injuries and deaths are rarely 
attributed to acts of violence. However, for the time being, it appears that the prevalence 
of national gun violence will continue to motivate fire agencies to weigh the merits of 
firearms programs. Thus, it is both more productive and relevant to discuss the emerging 
phenomenon of gun-carry adoption within the U.S. fire sector rather than engage in 
reaffirming the traditional stance of eschewing gun carriage. 
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IV. EVALUATING THREE OPTIONS FOR U.S. FIRE SECTOR 
GUN-CARRY POLICIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the gun carry policies used by fire departments in Sunnyvale, 
California, and Loveland, Colorado, and also examines the open-carry policy model used 
by a number of fire organizations located throughout the United States. These models were 
chosen because their methods of arming personnel are so diverse. First, Sunnyvale, 
California, arms its fire personnel by opting to consolidate police, fire, and medical services 
into one Department of Public Safety (DPS). Second, Loveland, Colorado’s Tactical Fire 
Teams (TFTs) train alongside their local police SWAT teams and are qualified to use all 
SWAT team weapons. Last, despite the lack of formal gun programs within many fire 
agencies, at least eight states currently allow fire department employees to carry concealed 
firearms while on duty. Comparing these model’s distinct traits can help fire sector 
decision-makers identify characteristics unique to each model that might best suit their 
particular needs. 
Each of these three policies will be examined in terms of five factors. First, they 
will each be assessed in terms of the costs associated with creating and maintaining these 
programs. Next, personnel response times will be considered as this impacts the availability 
of firearms should the need arise. Third, each model will be viewed through the filter of 
urban department versus rural agency needs and resources. Then, this review will discuss 
the impact of local gun laws vis -a-vis public and political attitudes toward each 
methodology. Finally, the sum of agencies practicing each model will be noted. The 
number of agencies using these three frameworks will help to illustrate the viability of each 
of the programs for fire sector decision-makers.  
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B. SUNNYVALE, CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
1. Background 
According to a 2020 NFPA report, there are more than 29,000 fire departments in 
the United States.168 At last official count, just 128 of these agencies employed a combined 
fire/medical and police service model like Sunnyvale, California (most commonly referred 
to as a Department of Public Safety).169 Sunnyvale Captain Jim Choi insists that 
Sunnyvale’s DPS enjoyed a smooth integration process in 1950 because the town of just 
10,000 citizens had a small police force and only a handful of volunteer firefighters.170 At 
the time of its inception, the Sunnyvale DPS model was thought to be both innovative and 
controversial. Today, pundits still agree that the agency is inventive in its approach to 
providing emergency service. However, across the nation, stakeholders continue to debate 
whether Sunnyvale’s DPS model is feasible for most municipalities.  
Despite the small number of cities using DPS systems, consideration of DPS 
programs like Sunnyvale’s has persisted.171 Some citizens and administrators believe that 
adding fire and medical care responsibilities to police forces will help soften police 
department images. Perennial calls for police reform have strengthened this argument. 
Moreover, wrongful use of force cases (i.e., George Floyd, Breana Taylor, etc.) have 
deepened the national division of opinions on police department legitimacy. The result has 
been a renewed interest in hybrid models like Sunnyvale’s DPS.172  
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From a financial perspective, many stakeholders believe that using a unified DPS 
system will result in long-term savings for taxpayers.173 Proponents of DPS organizations 
are critical of what they consider to be inefficient, traditional emergency service models. 
They stress that sustaining independent fire, medical, and police agencies leads to 
duplication of efforts, poor communication between operating forces, less flexibility in 
personnel use, and unnecessary administrative expenditures.174 Conversely, critics of 
Sunnyvale’s DPS template believe that the challenges tied to organizational consolidation 
are significant. For example, although Mata supports the general concept of DPS systems, 
he acknowledges significant hurdles to adopting the model, such as the need for “visionary 
leadership, a willingness to create change and culture, and supportive city government,” to 
name just a few.175  
2. Costs 
The cost-effectiveness of Sunnyvale’s DPS system remains in question. Rich 
Rifkin, an advocate for DPS models, reported that Sunnyvale’s per capita public safety 
costs were just $519 compared to $683 and $950 for neighboring towns Mountain View 
and Palo Alto, respectively.176 However, the lengthy training period for Public Safety 
Officers (PSOs) and expenses associated with said training have dissuaded some 
organizations from moving toward DPS frameworks.177 As per Sunnyvale’s recruitment 
materials, new DPS hires can expect 20 weeks of police training followed by a 16-week 
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fire academy, all capped by seven weeks of emergency medical training.178 Lee Romney 
affirms that Sunnyvale’s training costs are both “steep and constant.”179 
Agencies that opt to use DPS templates must remain aware of the risks associated 
with investing in such lengthy and expensive training. Unpredictable circumstances such 
as injuries, employee dissatisfaction, or overwhelming stresses related to emergency 
response work could cause highly-trained employees to abandon their positions 
prematurely. Additionally, suppose a disproportionate number of employees were to resign 
or retire in a short period. In that case, overtime payroll costs necessary to provide 
community coverage could quickly eclipse any financial benefits that DPS models offer. 
Furthermore, due to requisite training, it would take a minimum of 18 months to restore 
the workforce to proper levels (depending on the rate of attrition). Although the acquisition 
of firearms and related training make up just a fraction of all DPS operational expenses, 
this model’s aggregate costs are likely cost-prohibitive for larger fire agencies. 
3. Hastening Response Times 
Comparing public safety agency response times, which equate to the arrival of a 
firearm on an emergency scene, produces a unique set of challenges. All jurisdictions 
possess several innate characteristics that impact emergency response. Daniel Bennett 
explains that “not only are there differences in physical distances, road networks, traffic 
conditions, but also the distribution of call locations.”180 In sum, data comparisons 
between any two jurisdictions may, at first blush, appear to lack compatibility. 
Notwithstanding some subtle and other more apparent differences between emergency 
response organizations, comparative analysis remains a useful tool to measure agencies’ 
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strengths and weaknesses against others that operate within the same emergency response 
sector.  
The NFPA Standard 1710 delineates national fire sector response guidelines. The 
portion of that document which is most relevant to this discussion is the four-minute 
response requirement. NFPA 1710 mandates that the first fire unit dispatched to a medical 
or fire emergency arrive on the scene within four minutes 90% of the time.181 In contrast 
to the fire sector, Matt Halpin reports that law enforcement response for priority one calls 
involving life-threatening emergencies or dangerous crimes in-progress in ten major U.S. 
is at least a full minute and 20 seconds slower.182 Halpin further explains that both New 
York and Los Angeles response times top the six-minute mark, while San Jose’s law 
enforcement officers take more than nine minutes to arrive at pressing emergencies.183 
This dramatic disparity could result in the unnecessary loss of many lives. Angus Loten 
concurred and revealed that even modest reductions ( less than 60 seconds), in 911 response 
times could save thousands of lives in the U.S. on an annual basis.184 
One of the more compelling reasons to adopt a Sunnyvale DPS system is its 
potential to reduce emergency response times dramatically. Whereas most jurisdictions 
require timely, coordinated responses from three separate emergency agencies to address 
violent crises, Sunnyvale’s Public Safety Officers are trained and equipped for immediate 
intervention upon arrival at such emergencies. Mata supports this claim and adds that few 
incidents from the mundane to the sensational are purely police, fire, or medical 
emergencies.185  
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Adopting a DPS model may not guarantee emergency responses that hit the four-
minute mark required by NFPA 1710; however, using a DPS model might fill two current 
service gaps that place both emergency responders and the public in jeopardy. First, any 
shift toward fire service response times would have a positive impact on victim 
survivability. Second, scene safety can be vastly improved by ensuring that the first 
arriving DPS unit is equipped with a firearm to address lethal threats. National data 
indicates that fire service members will continue to arrive at most incidents ahead of LEOs. 
DPS frameworks eliminate the need to consider training fire service members with firearms 
independently of their LEO counterparts.  
4. Urban versus Rural Efficacy 
According to City Data, Sunnyvale has a 100% urban population of 153,656.186 
Sunnyvale’s DPS employs roughly 200 Public Safety Officers that patrol nearly 23 square 
miles.187 Sunnyvale enjoys a strong tax base, and the FY 2020/2021 budget has allocated 
more than $103 million to fund the DPS.188 Analysis of the FBI’s most recent data for 
violent crimes in 2018 reveals that Sunnyvale’s violent crime rate sits at just .93 per 
thousand people versus a national average of 2.47 for the same number of citizens.189 In 
2015, Smart Asset, using six metrics including violent crime rate, drug overdose rate, and 
percentage of the population engaged in excessive drinking, voted Sunnyvale, California, 
the safest city in America.190 
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Despite its long history of success in Sunnyvale, the DPS framework might be even 
more appropriate in rural settings where personnel is more limited, operating budgets are 
smaller, and police response time are significantly greater. Additionally, data typically used 
to measure public safety success may be skewed in the case of Sunnyvale. Unusually low 
violent crime rates in Sunnyvale may be steered more by lofty property values, 
extraordinarily high average household incomes, and substantial tax revenues that bolster 
public safety efforts than the effectiveness of the DPS model used there. 
5. Gun Laws, Politics and Local Attitudes 
In 2020, Giffords Law Center reported that California has the most robust gun 
legislation among all 50 U.S. states.191 Therefore, it seems somewhat counterintuitive that 
a city like Sunnyvale would opt to arm its firefighting personnel. The answer to this may 
be in the nomenclature itself. The public, politicians, and Sunnyvale DPS membership do 
not consider DPS personnel to be armed firefighters. The non-traditional nature of 
Sunnyvale’s public emergency structure nullifies the argument that firefighters should not 
carry weapons. Should trends continue and DPS models continue to proliferate, U.S. 
municipalities will likely grow to accept the incorporation of firearms into public safety as 
the norm regardless of regional gun laws, political stances, or traditional zeitgeists 
regarding armed firefighters. 
6. Conclusions 
Lori Moore-Merrell explains that effective fire emergency response performance is 
predicated upon availability, capability, and operational effectiveness.192 Presently, in the 
absence of firearms, fire agencies do not qualify as entities capable of appropriately 
addressing violent scenarios. Considering the statistical gap in fire and police response 
times, it may be prudent for many agencies to consider embracing a DPS model. However, 
although both fiscal constraints arising from COVID-19 and calls to reimagine U.S. 
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policing may nudge some cities toward a Sunnyvale system, there are still many obstacles 
to implementation.  
Morley and Hadley explain that the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) 
and International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) unions resist the idea of merging police 
and fire services.193 Beyond the weakening of their respective constituencies through 
reduced numbers of personnel, fire agencies claim that police/fire service mergers typically 
deteriorate firefighting skills as law enforcement training considerations supplant them.194 
Suggestions to downsize and integrate would likely be met with similar resistance from 
law enforcement entities who might naturally want to protect their particular interests. 
Furthermore, despite being one of the most vocal advocates for Sunnyvale’s DPS model, 
Sunnyvale Public Safety Chief Phan Ngo acknowledges that adoption of a Sunnyvale-style 
DPS requires “unique circumstances, capacity, and resources.”195 Jeremy Wilson and 
Clifford Grammich agree and point out that some municipalities are in the process of de-
consolidating DPS organizations due to various failures in meeting community needs.196 
Unexpected occurrences of population growth, increasing call volumes, and the 
increasingly technical nature of both police and fire services are just a few of the reasons 
cited for deconsolidation of DPS organizations. 
The DPS model appears to be appropriate for two vastly different types of cities. 
First, the model has flourished in Sunnyvale, California. This success might be attributed 
to the city’s adoption of DPS practices when Sunnyvale was merely in its infancy. The city 
had time to grow into the model, and it is hard to say if such a merger of services would 
work in a substantially larger city. Additionally, Sunnyvale is an affluent community with 
a low crime rate and high property values. Substantial tax revenues in Sunnyvale have 
helped to eliminate many fiscal concerns such as lengthy, expensive training. Countless 
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other cities would lack the ability to absorb such costs. Similarly, lower crime rates allow 
Sunnyvale to operate more efficiently using a DPS methodology. Many other locales 
experience substantially higher call volumes for violent incidents than Sunnyvale, where 
the ten-year average for 2000–2019 sits at just over 181violent crimes per year.197 Higher 
crime jurisdictions would not be a good fit for this paradigm. 
DPS would also work well in smaller jurisdictions, regardless of budget, where 
violent emergency calls occur at a similar rate. The shared administrative costs of DPS 
agencies make more sense for resource-strained areas than they do for a city like 
Sunnyvale. Finally, smaller fire departments are less likely to have large, strong unions that 
have had a history of impeding emergency service branch mergers.  
C. LOVELAND. COLORADO, FIRE RESCUE AUTHORITY, TACTICAL 
RESCUE TEAMS 
1. Background 
In 1911, the Loveland Fire Department was created by merging two local, rival fire 
agencies.198 Then on January 1, 2012, after the city of Loveland and the Loveland Rural 
Fire Protection District agreed to combine resources, the department was reconstituted 
again into the Loveland Fire Rescue Authority (LFRA).199 Following operations at several 
complicated emergencies involving illegal drug laboratories, the LFRA decided to 
construct a unique unit know as a Tactical Fire Team to help assist the local Loveland 
Police Department (LPD) SWAT team at potentially volatile calls.200  
Loveland’s TFT is a single dedicated company comprised of seven team members 
and a fire battalion chief who supervises all TFT calls. Loveland has acknowledged the 
need for contingencies when the designated TFT is engaged. Therefore, the LFRA has 
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further supplemented TFT manpower by training a handful of additional firefighters 
assigned to LFRA units outside of the TFT. These members can be called upon to bolster 
any particular TFT operation or respond to secondary or tertiary emergencies. As per 
LFRA’s operational protocols, the TFT’s primary functions are to support SWAT 
operations at 1) active shooter incidents, 2) barricade situations, 3) clandestine labs, 4) 
hostage rescue, 5) mutual aid requests from LPD SWAT, and 6) other missions based on 
needs of LPD SWAT (i.e., VIP details, motorcades, etc.).201 Finally, Vargas suggests that 
TFTs like Loveland’s offer a” possible mitigation strategy for hostile incidents requiring 
firefighting services in the midst of a law enforcement incident.”202  
2. Costs 
Expenses associated with the addition of TFTs in Loveland are minimal compared 
to a DPS system like Sunnyvale, California. First, recruiting members is a seamless, cost-
free enterprise as TFT participants are selected from LFRA’s rank and file members. 
Second, training members for inclusion on TFTs does not require comprehensive law 
enforcement academy training. The average length of a U.S. police training program 
(outside of field training) sits at approximately 840 hours or 21 weeks.203 Brett Meade 
reported that the cost of recruiting, equipping, and training a single police officer can 
exceed $100,000.204 By comparison, Loveland’s TFT members are only required to meet 
basic SWAT school standards, negotiate a bi-annual physical agility course, and complete 
less than a dozen monthly training hours with the LPD SWAT team.205 Last and most 
notably, TFT members are not assigned firearms. Although TFT members attend SWAT 
school and must demonstrate proficiency with all SWAT firearms, they do not carry 
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weapons on duty. TFT weapons training is promoted so that tactical firefighters can secure 
all guns at the scene of emergencies. Loveland Division Chief Greg Ward adds that 
firefighters are also capable of defending themselves with a firearm if a SWAT member 
becomes incapacitated.206  
In short, firearms use for Loveland’s TFT is a last resort for infrequent and unusual 
circumstances. This approach varies significantly from many fire agencies where 
firefighters are integrated with police and medical personnel in Rescue Task Forces 
(RTFs). Typical fire task forces are not trained in firearm use. They are prohibited from 
discharging firearms and are discouraged from securing loose or unaccounted for 
weapons.207 
Thus far, Loveland has resisted the temptation to fully train TFT members as law 
enforcement officers. LFRA has also intentionally opted to refrain from purchasing 
firearms for TFT personnel. The combined savings to the department sit at roughly 
$100,500 per TFT operator. Not only do ongoing drills and training that combine Loveland 
SWAT and LFRA TFTs come with a much smaller price tag than traditional LEO training, 
but this model acts as a compromise between models that arm firefighters and models that 
do not. While traditional RTF models ignore the possible need for firearms use, Loveland 
TFT operators are expected to secure or discharge SWAT weapons as an appropriate 
response to life and death scenarios.  
Kindy et al. reported that U.S. law enforcement officers shoot nearly 1,000 citizens 
per year.208 Furthermore, according to Bret Mock, every year U.S. municipalities spend 
tens of millions of dollars paying complainants for excessive use of force claims.209 
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Although not all excessive use of force claims are gun-related, the use of firearms invites 
potentially significant financial liabilities. LFRA’s tactical framework provides for its 
members’ safety while avoiding the expenses associated with excessive force claims tied 
to weapons. Thus, this model may be most appealing for risk-averse cities that do not have 
the financial wherewithal to engage in costly legal cases and payouts that stem from firearm 
use.  
3. Response Times 
Loveland’s current guidelines for TFT response are insufficient to deal with time-
sensitive emergency events. LFRA’s tactical team structure does not support independent 
engagement by tactical teams at hostile events. This means that even tactically trained 
firefighters are required to await law enforcement’s arrival before intervening in violent 
incidents. Moreover, because TFTs are in service for routine calls for help, dedicated 
tactical members might be previously engaged when their assistance is most needed. 
Loveland does have a back-up pool of tactical team trained members. However, 
coordinating their formation for emergency responses would invariably lead to significant 
delays in response times. The current method for contacting off-duty, trained TFT members 
is via phone call or text message.210 
While the NFPA 1710, four-minute response standard would still apply to 
Loveland’s regular fire service members, that requirement does not apply to specialized 
units akin to Loveland’s TFTs. Surprisingly, under Loveland’s latest operational manual, 
TFT members are required to respond within less than one hour of notification of an 
emergency incident.211 This generous allowance for response is grossly inadequate as the 
American College of Surgeons stresses that severely bleeding wounds can cause death in 
as little as five minutes.212 
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4. Urban versus Rural Efficacy 
The LFRA is an interesting case study in that the department was born of the 
merging of a city fire agency and a separate rural fire organization. This blending implies 
that the LFRA is compromised of the most useful traits (equipment and operational) of 
both types of fire services. The strength of the LFRA TFT model lies in its ability to address 
various emergency scenarios that require the combined expertise of fire and police services. 
Since TFT members consistently train alongside police SWAT counterparts across 
multiple emergency scenarios, they should operate well in both urban and rural settings.  
The biggest drawback of this model, regardless of setting, is the unpredictable 
availability of tactically trained units. As long as TFT forces are still required to answer 
routine calls for assistance, their readiness will remain in doubt. High call volumes 
commonly experienced in larger cities would necessitate an expansion of the TFT model 
to several units. Development of the system to ensure proper coverage and availability 
would cut into the program’s cost-savings benefits. Nonetheless, the model’s adoption 
would still result in massive savings on training, weapons, and legal liability compared to 
a DPS framework. 
The most problematic facet of a TFT model in a rural setting is slow reflex time. 
The geography of sprawling rural areas could significantly hinder the response and 
formation of TFTs. As previously indicated, Loveland allows up to one hour for TFT 
members to ready themselves. Thus, the random nature of many acts of violence coupled 
with the medical necessity for rapid bleeding intervention and medical care indicate that 
the TFT model is not an ideal fit for patient survivability in rural settings. Instead, when 
practiced outside of concentrated response areas, Loveland’s TFT model is most 
appropriate for use at preplanned operations or other incidents that are not time-sensitive. 
5. Gun Laws, Politics and Local Attitudes 
A Gifford’s Law Center report ranks Colorado 14 out of 50 states in gun safety.213 
Colorado is a shall-issue state, where local sheriffs are mandated to issue permits to those 
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who meet firearms requirements immediately.214 Open carry and concealed carry of 
firearms are also legal in Colorado, except for Denver and a handful of other posted 
locations.215 Colorado is also one of 23 “Castle Doctrine” states.216 This means that gun 
owners have no responsibility to retreat before discharging a firearm in their home, vehicle, 
or workplace if they are defending themselves against an intruder.  
One of the most appealing aspects of Loveland’s TFT system, regarding attitudes 
toward guns, is that it straddles the line between gun advocacy and gun rejection. 
Politicians and citizens alike can support a TFT framework without feeling like they are 
taking a polarizing stance. Gun advocates can take comfort in knowing that TFT members 
are offered some measure of protection by being trained with all SWAT weapons. In the 
alternative, those who oppose firearms can remain satisfied that TFT members are not 
issued weapons and may only use a gun under a particular set of circumstances. This model 
offers the possibility of an equitable compromise where many other fire sector models do 
not. The TFT approach appears to provide the most diplomatic solution to arming members 
of the fire service. Therefore, the TFT model may receive more political and public support 
than many alternatives.  
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6. Who Else Is Using This Model? 
Cities such as New York, Naperville, Chicago, and Coral Springs, Florida, have all 
implemented their own brand of integrated tactical response teams.217 Like the LFRA, 
many jurisdictions have identified the need to coordinate emergency scene entry, patient 
packaging, and victim removal with law enforcement agencies. However, what sets the 
LFRA apart is that its personnel are trained to handle the full-compliment of SWAT 
weapons in use at operations. This means that should the need arise, they are authorized to 
use guns as a means of defense or escape.  
Although the NFPA ASHER 3000 standard encourages national adoption of 
integrated fire and police RTFs, the standard maintains a clear separation of fire and police 
responsibilities. Under ASHER 3000, law enforcement agents alone are tasked with force 
protection. Conversely, fire sector operators are responsible for patient care and removal. 
NFPA endorsement of rapid entry and intervention by RTFs suggests national support for 
this model will grow. For the time being, Loveland’s TFT will likely remain an outlier 
program until it can gain the backing from an agency such as the NFPA. 
7. Conclusions 
The TFT model provides a less dramatic shift in fire sector resources than a DPS 
model. TFTs do not take on law enforcement responsibilities, nor are they solely dedicated 
to violent or tactical emergency responses. Instead, the specialized group continues to 
engage in standard medical and fire responses during daily operations. This model’s 
ambivalent nature could lead to greater stakeholder support than more polarizing options 
such as DPS or concealed carry practices. 
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The recent enactment of a national tactical team standard in NFPA 3000, which 
prohibits firearms use by firefighters, does not reflect either a rejection or acceptance of 
Loveland’s TFT model. Though NFPA 3000 currently denies firefighters the use of 
weapons, it does acknowledge the often-simultaneous need for both firearms and fire sector 
services at hostile events. Simply stated, the ASHER 3000 standard insists on the 
integration of police and fire resources. Perhaps the guideline may be revisited at a later 
time to include firearms training in the image of Loveland’s TFT. 
D. CONCEALED CARRY FRAMEWORK 
1. Background 
The concealed carry framework is the most liberal of the three models considered 
in this chapter. Concealed carry strengths and weakness are tightly coupled. In one sense, 
allowing licensed fire personnel to bring their own weapons into the work setting alleviates 
the financial pressures of outfitting personnel with guns and providing associated training. 
Conversely, using this model, fire agencies forfeit control over who can carry a firearm, 
the types of guns being held, and how many guns are present at any particular emergency 
response.  
Advocates of the concealed carry model support Jason Lyon who asserts that an 
increase in the number of firearms, growth in the numbers of potentially armed people, the 
relaxation of the rules of engagement in the use of deadly force, and a lack of faith in the 
government’s ability to protect the citizenry have made the emergency-response landscape 
dangerous for law enforcement and emergency services personnel.218 Lyon also contends 
that ubiquitous crisis events involving firearms now preclude firefighters from maintaining 
safe standoff distances as they are increasingly called to enter warm zones alongside law 
enforcement agents.219 The concealed carry model has gained traction in recent years, most 
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notably in Florida following the delayed and ineffectual medical interventions at the 
Marjory Stoneman High School shooting in Parkland.220 
In Virginia, Senator Amanda Chase, the mother of an emergency medical 
technician (EMT), has sponsored a bill in the Virginia Senate that would allow firefighters, 
EMTs, and paramedics to carry weapons.221 Chase explains that firefighters and EMS 
personnel may need to defend themselves, especially at the scene of a violent incident. She 
asserts that the availability of force protection may prove to be even more imperative in 
Virginia’s rural areas where law enforcement is spread thin and are often delayed in 
arriving at emergencies.222 Virginia and Georgia are not unique in seeking carry policies 
for firefighters. Other states, including Kansas, Ohio, and Tennessee, currently allow 
department members to carry concealed weapons to defend themselves.223 Additionally, 
Mississippi and Texas have proposed bills with similar aims.  
2. Response Times 
If leveraged to its maximum capability, the concealed carry framework could match 
the Sunnyvale DPS response times. Upon arrival, fire service members, following hidden 
carry practices, would be immediately available to address violent situations. However, 
under a concealed carry program, the decision to carry a firearm rests with each firefighter. 
Therefore, available force-protection would not be guaranteed.  
Currently, comprehensive data on firefighter’s collective position on carrying 
weapons is lacking. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the percentage of firefighters 
who would opt for carrying a firearm with any degree of accuracy. That said, a 2020 poll 
of EMTs and paramedics conducted by EMS1 revealed that only 59% of respondents 
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thought firearms were an appropriate tool for use in the prehospital medical care setting.224 
Although EMT and paramedic support for carrying firearms is more than triple that of U.S. 
educators, a lack of total commitment to this model would assuredly lead to unreliable 
weapons availability.225 Nonetheless, if 60% of firefighters were to be armed, the 
concealed carry model would most often be more responsive than Loveland’s TFT system. 
A concealed carry program would place at least one firearm at the scene of a violent 
incident well in advance of Loveland’s one-hour allowance for TFT response.  
3. Urban versus Rural Efficacy 
The concealed carry model would be most useful in rural settings. This is not to say 
that the model is ineffective or inappropriate within urban environments. Instead, the 
adoption of concealed carry policies addresses commonly encountered rural problems such 
as a more limited law enforcement presence, slower law enforcement response times, and 
larger response areas. By comparison, most urban areas enjoy larger, more well-funded 
police forces, faster response times, and smaller response areas.226 
Another compelling reason for rural jurisdictions to pursue concealed carry 
doctrines is improved intervention times at medical emergency calls. Research conducted 
by Ahmed Ramdan M. Alanazy et al. confirms that prehospital medical response times are 
slower in rural areas resulting in lower survival rates for trauma patients.227 Fire personnel 
responding in a medical capacity must reduce patient access and removal times to lower 
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these mortality rates. Concealed carry practitioners can provide the force protection needed 
for swift entry and immediate patient care during hostile events. 
Although 97% of the United States is considered rural, only 19% of citizens live in 
rural areas.228 Therefore, the implementation of concealed carry methods exclusively in 
rural areas would benefit only one in five Americans. Nonetheless, the model is a good fit 
for rural regions and may be best tested and fine-tuned within jurisdictions that operate 
outside of urban locales. Through an iterative process of using, learning, and adjusting, fire 
organizations located in more rural areas may perfect protocols that might serve all fire 
service agencies regardless of geography. 
4. Gun Laws, Politics and Local Attitudes 
Concealed carry, in some form or fashion, is allowed in all 50 U.S. states. However, 
some states can either refuse to grant concealed carry permits or make it exceedingly 
difficult to acquire a license.229 Fifteen constitutional carry states currently allow anyone 
of legal age to carry a concealed firearm without a permit.230 Furthermore, there are 27 
shall issue states that require a permit to carry a concealed weapon.231 However, such 
concealed carry permits must be issued to applicants that meet the standards set by state 
laws without any requirement to show a particular need for a firearm. The remaining states 
are known as “may issue” jurisdictions. This means that states have discretion in whether 
they choose to issue concealed carry permits on a case by case basis.  
States that allow citizens to carry concealed firearms outnumber those who may 
prohibit the practice by more than a five to one ratio. The liberal use of concealed carry 
legislation in so many regions of the country is indicative of the general public acceptance 
of the practice. However, Mark Gius’s recent research revealed that states with more 
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relaxed conceal carry laws experienced 12.9% higher gun-related murder rates than less 
permissive states.232 
Compelling gun-violence statistics may eventually lead to the tightening of conceal 
carry laws. Nonetheless, it is probable that support for this model within the fire sector will 
likely mirror public attitudes toward citizen’s conceal carry rights within each region.  
5. Who Else is Using This Model? 
Presently, there is no comprehensive tracking of conceal carry practices within the 
fire sector. Agencies such as the NFPA, NIOSH, OSHA, and USFA have all ignored the 
steady stream of proposals for integrating a concealed carry option into fire organizations 
across the United States. Additionally, the same agencies seem to have overlooked ongoing 
concealed carry operations in at least eight states. 
It is difficult to determine what factors might trigger further adoption of concealed 
carry models across the United States. That said, Florida is an example of a jurisdiction 
that adopted conceal carry protocols as a reaction to a heinous mass shooting. Following 
initial gunfire at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, preliminary 
patient contact by unarmed fire/paramedics took as long as 43 minutes.233 Hence, public 
and political dismay over that delayed response propelled the swift proposal and enactment 
of concealed carry laws. 
Forthcoming acceptance of concealed carry policies may depend on future violent 
crime rates. In particular, emotionally charged tragedies like mass casualty incidents appear 
to prompt the type of legislative changes needed for concealed carry adoption. 
Additionally, data on concealed carry safety and efficacy will emerge from the handful of 
vanguard states. This information will undoubtedly influence other jurisdiction’s views on 
the feasibility of this model. 
 
232. Mark Gius, “Using the Synthetic Control Method to Determine the Effects of Concealed Carry 
Laws on State-Level Murder Rates,” International Review of Law and Economics 57 (March 1, 2019): 
1–11, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.10.005. 




The Sunnyvale DPS model, the Loveland TFT model, and concealed carry models 
considered here are only three options for U.S. fire agencies to consider. There are a 
virtually unlimited number of potential variations on these three models and many more 
beyond them based on permutations of alternative models. These three frameworks are 
offered as a starting point for contemplation and are meant to highlight some critical facets 
of firearms programs. 
U.S. fire agency decision-makers will continue to grapple with an array of 
challenges if they opt to engage in arming fire personnel. Regardless of what firearm 
system is scrutinized, the programs’ costs, impacts on response times, and the best 
application for rural versus urban settings will have to be weighed. Likewise, political, 
public, and legislative influences will continue to guide decisions in this arena. Arming fire 
sector personnel is a complex decision. The comparative analysis of contrasting models 
addressing congruent concerns helps untangle this knotty debate. 
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A. SUMMATION: AFTERMATH AND OBSTACLES OF CHOOSING 
FIREARMS PROGRAMS 
Although there is no national consensus on whether firearms are an appropriate tool 
for fire sector personnel, U.S. fire agencies continue to incorporate weapons into their 
response matrices. This thesis acknowledges that support for gun-carry programs is by no 
means universal. Nonetheless, as fire sector stakeholders struggle to address public safety 
issues, many agencies continue to embrace firearms programs. The lack of consolidated 
guidance from safety organizations, governmental bodies, and fire sector pundits alike 
validates the need for this comparative analysis. 
The purpose of this Policy Options Analysis is to provide fire sector decision-
makers and other stakeholders with critical information that can be leveraged to improve 
deliberations regarding firearms programs. While many fire agencies continue to absorb 
myriad responsibilities associated with firearms use, many do so with an incomplete 
understanding of the process. To state that, in general, the fire sector’s knowledge of 
firearms policies is imperfect is not to place blame on fire service practitioners. Instead, a 
lack of participation by those outside the fire service has led to misconceptions about 
firearms programs’ complexity. Governmental bodies, safety organizations, and the public 
have all done a poor job contributing to policy development. The silence of legislators and 
safety agencies alike has created a vacuum of information pertaining to firearms in the fire 
service; this document attempts to fill that void. 
This thesis has defined some of the most relevant factors for fire agencies to 
consider as they weigh the viability of firearms policies. Research conducted here has 
substantiated the need to consider both law enforcement and education sector gun-carry 
policies. Fire entities should study police and school gun models because all three sectors 
share a common problem space. Furthermore, the study of Sunnyvale, Loveland, and 
concealed carry models offers a sample of diverse and practical approaches to addressing 
an array of violent emergency scenarios. Fire agencies might turn to any or all of these 
policies for guidance during the initial policy building stages.  
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This chapter catalogs key aspects of previous chapters. First, barriers to and 
consequences of fire service firearms programs will be discussed. Second, crucial 
takeaways from research related to law enforcement, education sector, and governmental 
influence will be reexamined. Third, DPS, TFT, and conceal model implications will be 
distilled. Finally, the four most remarkable findings of this thesis are enumerated. Those 
notable conclusions are  
1. Education program models are the safest for gun training, storage, and 
handling.  
2. The federal government is capable of establishing national firearms 
policies for the fire sector.  
3. National safety agencies need to be more active in setting and enforcing 
fire service workplace standards.  
4. Fire agencies can gain more support for firearms programs by either 
rebranding their agencies or by retitling their employees. 
There are several impediments and many consequences for fire agencies that 
choose to add firearms to operational catalogs. For one, fire organizations must convince 
stakeholders that weapons are a necessary tool before they can introduce them. Citizen 
support for gun programs cannot be assumed. Since current data indicates that fire sector 
injuries and deaths are typically unrelated to gun violence, justifying weapons models will 
remain a challenge. 
Should the hurdles of public and political backing be cleared, resource allocation 
could cause further friction in establishing fire carry models. Among other costs, proposed 
budgets will have to account for the procurement, training, and maintenance of handguns. 
Cash-strapped municipalities that wish to move forward with firearms models will likely 
have to compromise on some aspects of firearms programs. Perhaps resource-strained 
departments will reduce costs with shorter training programs, cheaper firearms, or less 
costly oversight protocols. Furthermore, municipalities may be forced to steer away from 
their preferred model and toward one that can land within budgetary boundaries. 
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Undoubtedly, the incorporation of firearms models into any jurisdiction will force some 
tough financial decisions.  
Heavy responsibilities lie beyond the establishment of gun-carry programs. Fire 
agencies must understand that they take on substantial liabilities when arming personnel. 
Lost, stolen, or misused weapons are just a few of the potential paths leading to additional 
financial burdens via costly litigation. Moreover, fire departments must acknowledge that 
even adequately trained operators frequently miss their intended targets. Thus far, data 
consistently confirms that stellar marksmanship among trained LEOs is an anomaly. 
Superior aim in operational settings while under duress is typically aspirational and is 
seldom realized.  
It is unlikely that this particular policy analysis will be sufficient to suit all fire 
agencies’ needs. Many fire sector decision-makers could insist that their community’s 
requirements are so unique that they warrant tailor-made firearms carry policies. However, 
given the general lack of literature regarding firearms policies in the fire sector, this policy 
analysis is worthy of inclusion in deliberations on the matter. The information amassed 
here can stimulate conversations that might produce safer, more economical, and more 
widely accepted gun-carry practices within the fire sector. 
B. EVALUATION OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT SECTOR 
Fire sector organizations should not haphazardly model gun-carry programs in the 
image of law enforcement agencies. Although U.S. policing entities have the most 
extensive history of firearms use among emergency response agencies, the law 
enforcement sector struggles with firearm-related policy issues. Law enforcement pundits 
and practitioners alike disagree on what constitutes adequate weapons training. 
Additionally, inconsistent gun storage practices within the law enforcement community 
have led to many lost, stolen, and misused handguns. Moreover, most law enforcement 
organizations have historically abysmal accuracy rates when discharging firearms. Fire 
agencies must improve upon these perennial weaknesses of law enforcement models. 
Generally speaking, most of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies do not 
exemplify ideal firearms programs. However, fire sector policymakers should not discount 
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some of the more effective police gun programs. Police departments with the most 
comprehensive firearms training and best safety records should still be considered potential 
fire organizations’ templates. Also, even those police agencies with the poorest firearms 
track-records might serve as examples of frameworks to be avoided. 
Inadequate funding is one of the biggest obstacles to gun safety training and 
effective policy practices. It simply may not be possible for many fire agencies to fashion 
their programs to meet the standards of superlative police agencies. For example, the 
Sunnyvale, California, DPS, which enjoys consistently low crime rates, represents an 
affluent population. It is doubtful that most U.S. municipalities could or would match such 
a city’s public service budgets. Citizens and budget planners will have to agree to 
compromises on firearms frameworks if they hope to build financially sustainable 
programs. 
On balance, the law enforcement sector’s spotty gun-safety history indicates that 
fire service gun-program architects can learn more from LE mistakes than from LE 
successes. Collectively, perennial LE errors such as unintentional discharges, tactical 
shooting mistakes, and friendly fire mishaps have been far too commonplace. Likewise, 
LE personnel have long-standing issues with both marksmanship and gun storage 
compliance. Nonetheless, those highly proficient LE gun experts and LE organizations 
renowned for best gun-carry practices remain valuable resources for organizations in need 
of direction.  
C. EVALUATION OF THE EDUCATION SECTOR 
Debates over arming teachers reveal many of the same concerns as those found 
when discussing fire sector firearms programs. Thus far, the most remarkable aspect of 
armed teacher programs is their nearly flawless safety records. Therefore, when opting for 
handguns, fire agencies should mimic the firearms practices of school districts. Since 
school models have proven to be universally effective throughout the United States, fire 
agencies should consider replicating local schools’ frameworks that serve the same 
communities they do. Fire departments might benefit from reproducing protocols that have 
already been deemed safe and effective within their jurisdictions. Furthermore, community 
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familiarity with established gun-carry policies could help reduce anxiety and resistance to 
the idea of arming firefighters. 
The most glaring weakness of education sector firearms policies is a general lack 
of support from the teachers. Teachers who repudiate firearms proposals outnumber those 
who advocate for guns in classrooms at a four to one ratio. Similar to teachers, fire 
personnel are civil servants that lack a long-standing relationship with weapons. Likely, 
fire department employees and the unions that protect many of them would resist gun 
carriage proposals. Fire organizations must gauge the willingness of employees to carry 
sidearms before attempting to insist upon their use. 
1. Assessment of Government’s Role 
The enumerated powers of Congress outlined in the U.S. Constitution effectively 
preclude the federal government from dictating national gun-carry policies. Although 
several federal gun-related acts have come to pass, none establish guidelines for the 
carriage of weapons within fire service organizations. The historical lack of legislative 
collaboration among federal stakeholders in governing gun policies indicates that best 
practices will continue to be determined by state-level partners. Nonetheless, LEOSA 
legislation enacted post 9/11 proves that the establishment of a national gun policy is 
possible when urgent public safety concerns warrant it. 
The asymmetrical nature of U.S. state gun regulations reflects an uneven tolerance 
for firearms across the nation. For the time being, interstate cooperation is still lacking, and 
state legislators will continue to back gun policies that only consider their respective states’ 
needs. However, all hope of future collaboration is not lost. Universal state cooperation on 
several federal firearms acts and the relatively new LEOSA legislation hint at the potential 
for future interstate partnerships. It is possible that in time, through an iterative process, 
best firearm carry practices might emerge that will suit the needs of many or all states. 
Until such a time, the status quo is likely to produce disparate practices among U.S. states. 
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2. Recap of Safety Agencies  
U.S. safety agencies that regulate fire organization workplaces have abandoned 
their responsibility to direct gun-carry policies. All evidence suggests that the misstep is 
intentional rather than accidental. Since safety agencies refuse to offer concise explanations 
for their lack of participation, one can only speculate why they choose to withdraw from 
this conversation. One likely cause of this collective inertia is the highly polarizing nature 
of the gun control debate. Fear of coming down on the wrong side of this gun dilemma has 
had a chilling effect on agencies such as OSHA, NIOSH, USFA, and the NFPA, and so 
they continue to retreat from the gun-related discourse. Safety-agency abstention is a 
critical error that should be corrected. 
Since not one of the agencies discussed here has opted to take ownership of this 
problem, perhaps one solution is for the federal government to assign the responsibility. 
These agencies are typically eager to guide myriad workplace safety issues, and so it makes 
little sense that they should all withhold input on firearms policies. A review of the agencies 
noted above reveals that the NFPA’s influence should be leveraged to establish gun-carry 
policies within the fire sector. Relative to other safety agencies, the NFPA has produced 
unparalleled success in setting fire sector standards and coordinating compliance across the 
broad swathe of fire industry organizations.  
D. OPTIONS ANALYSIS LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Review of Sunnyvale’s Department of Public Safety 
Sunnyvale, California, has demonstrated the soundness of a hybrid DPS 
methodology for decades. DPS practitioners can rest easy knowing that the first arriving 
DPS officer to any violent emergency will have a firearm readily available. However, 
providing that weapon and sustaining the DPS model is an expensive proposition. 
Additionally, less than 150 U.S. cities have turned to a DPS model to address public safety 
concerns, implying that the model is not a good fit for most U.S. municipalities. Moreover, 
as some cities look to consolidate public services, several others are deconsolidating their 
integrated (police/fire) departments.  
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Cities that believe a DPS framework is the most economical way to provide 
emergency services must be alert to the enormous training costs of DPS programs. 
Additionally, decision-makers should also look carefully at the budgets, response areas, 
personnel pools, and call volumes of jurisdictions that employ DPS practices. The DPS 
methodology may only prove cost-effective for cities with very particular sets of needs and 
resources.  
2. Takeaways from Loveland’s Tactical Firefighting Teams Model 
Loveland, Colorado’s TFT platform may appeal to the broadest audience. In one 
respect, Loveland TFTs answer the concerns of those opposed to guns in the fire service. 
The TFT protocols used in Loveland significantly limit the authorized use of firearms. 
Loveland firefighters do not carry sidearms while responding to routine calls, and the 
discharge of firearms by TFT members is prohibited until particular criteria are met. 
Conversely, gun advocates might appreciate that Loveland is thoughtful and proactive by 
providing their TFTs with firearms training. Loveland has demonstrated its intention to 
protect first responders and the public by integrating Loveland SWAT and Loveland TFT 
members during training and operations.  
The TFT model is best suited to fire agencies that do not want to wholly commit to 
firearms programs. In a sense, this model splits the difference between arming and not 
arming fire service members. Also, training alongside police SWAT operators offers fire 
TFTs an intimate view of the equipment and training needed to address violent emergencies 
that require the presence of firearms. Fire department administrators can monitor 
Loveland’s integrated training exercises and operations to help decide if a fully dedicated 
firearm program makes sense for their organizations. 
The biggest drawback of a TFT proposal is its failure to guarantee rapid responses 
to pressing emergencies. Loveland’s firefighting operational guide concedes that TFT 
members are allotted up to one hour to arrive on the scene of an urgent situation. Most fire 
organizations would not embrace this timeline. Fire agencies would need to dramatically 
expand this model to ensure the immediate availability of members and equipment. 
Unfortunately, the additional manpower and equipment required to allow for effective 
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responses are costly. Thus, correcting TFT resource shortfalls would result in increased 
expenses, diminishing the model’s overall appeal. 
3. Concealed Carry Summary 
In recent years, a surge in the number of mass casualty incidents has led to the 
adoption of concealed carry policies by several U.S. states. Virginia, Georgia, Kansas, 
Ohio, Florida, and Texas are just a handful of states that allow fire personnel to carry 
concealed weapons as a means of protection. Currently, there is insufficient data to 
determine if concealed carry policies are meeting performance expectations. As time 
passes and more robust data emerges on the efficacy of concealed carry policies, state-level 
stakeholders will be able to make more informed adjustments to hidden carry programs. 
States will need to assign an existing entity the chores of collecting and processing this 
invaluable information or, in the alternative, establish a new agency to accomplish those 
tasks. 
Conceal-carry systems benefit fire agencies and fire personnel in several ways. 
First, conceal-carry models afford the most flexibility for fire service members. Secondly, 
concealed carry is an optional framework. Those employees who wish to arm themselves 
can do so without fear of sanctions. Alternatively, concealed carry policies accommodate 
personnel that choose to operate without firearms as well. This system is unique in that it 
can satisfy the individual preferences of most employees. Aside from offending employees 
who might prefer to work in an utterly weapon-free environment, conceal carry succeeds 
in offering diametrically opposed options, whereas DPS and TFT models do not. Finally, 
conceal carry models also make economic sense for agencies that want to eliminate 
firearms training and procurement costs.  
There are some crucial tradeoffs for the savings realized through the use of 
concealed carry systems. By adopting conceal carry, fire agencies relinquish control over 
who is carrying firearms at any given time. Since having a weapon becomes optional, 
determining the number of firearms at an emergency becomes guesswork. The lack of one 
standard policy effectively undermines confidence that a gun will be available if needed. 
Additionally, although fire agencies do not provide guns for employees, they can still be 
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held liable for accidental discharges or inappropriate use of force scenarios. Furthermore, 
given that concealed carry training would occur outside of a fire organization’s purview, 
the agency would have to accept responsibility for personnel training inconsistencies.  
E. LIMITATIONS  
The consideration of many alternative firearms policies to those studied here is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as so many fire agencies have settled upon using 
one of the three frameworks explored here, it is fair to say that all three are worthy of 
making the shortlist for policy consideration. Additionally, this thesis’s scope did not allow 
for comparing how or even if these three models are superior to other proposed policies. 
The author concedes that other gun models may contain useful approaches to safely and 
effectively incorporate firearms into fire organizations. Instead of excluding alternative 
gun-carry plans not covered by this research, the author suggests such policies be weighed 
alongside the models already put forth here for their ability to address any needs that might 
have been overlooked. 
A stronger case could have been made for the rejection of firearms programs 
altogether. Indeed, statistical data for the last decade reveals that just one firefighter is 
killed by gunfire annually. Moreover, although all shooting deaths are tragic, thus far, there 
is no evidence that the presence of a firearm can guarantee personnel safety at violent 
incidents. This thesis briefly acknowledges the possibility that weapons may be 
inappropriate for use within the fire sector. However, this research’s main thrust assumes 
that many fire agencies want to incorporate firearms into operational practices. In sum, this 
analysis is not intended to dissuade decision-makers from rejecting firearms policies. 
Instead, this evaluation of gun programs is meant to flesh out some of the most relevant 
conversations surrounding the decision to choose one firearm model over all others. 
Admittedly, choosing no model at all may indeed be the best course of action for most, if 
not all, fire agencies. 
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Like so many governmental activities, public policymaking is a complex system. 
In other words, not all aspects of the endeavor can be controlled or predicted.234 Similarly, 
it would be naïve to assert that all factors which impact firearms policies can be discussed 
within the span of 100 pages. Countless unique characteristics help define and impact 
individual fire organizations. Variables such as community population size, geographical 
location, and command structure are just a few traits that work independently and 
collectively to shape fire departments in distinctive ways.  
Agencies that create firearms policies must be mindful of the malleable nature of 
public opinion, community needs, and fiscal impacts of such programs. Therefore, the 
construction of policies should begin by prioritizing agility and flexibility. Policy architects 
must avoid monolithic firearms models as they will inevitably fail to meet one or more 
needs of the communities they serve. The variables that inform the decision to arm 
firefighters or disarm firefighters are ever-changing, and they need to be continually 
monitored. Ongoing data collection and analysis will remain invaluable tools for decision-
makers. 
F. FINDINGS 
This research has resulted in four significant conclusions. The first is that when fire 
sector agencies opt to arm personnel, they should model their programs after school sector 
programs rather than law enforcement programs. Although law enforcement agencies have 
had a longer relationship with firearms, the school sector has enjoyed a safer one. Since 
safety will remain a paramount concern for stakeholders, fire sector policy construction 
should focus on adopting the best practices of armed school districts. 
The second main conclusion of this research is that the U.S. federal government 
can enact national gun legislation within the fire sector. Despite some inherent 
constitutional limitations, federal stakeholders have already coordinated to develop a 
national firearms policy. A unification of public and political thoughts and actions followed 
the events of 9/11. This alliance, focused on combatting terrorism, resulted in an 
 
234. Bernardo Mueller, “Why Public Policies Fail: Policymaking under Complexity,” EconomiA 21, 
no. 2, (May–August, 2020): 311–323, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2019.11.002. 
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unprecedented opportunity to enact LEOSA legislation. The question remains, can the 
politicians and public once again be persuaded that national gun violence threats merit a 
consolidation of effort to pass one federal firearms policy for fire sector first responders.  
A third major finding of this thesis is that U.S. safety agencies have been remiss in 
their duty to set standards for guns in fire sector workplaces. U.S. safety agencies continue 
to weigh in on a nearly innumerable array of occupational hazards. Additionally, OSHA, 
NIOSH, USFA, and the NFPA’s mission statements insist that their raison d’etre is to 
secure fire service members’ health and safety. At a minimum, one of these safety entities 
should regulate safe gun training, operational usage, maintenance, and storage practices for 
armed personnel. This research determined that the NFPA is uniquely suited to enacting 
gun safety standards and ensuring sector-wide compliance. 
A final noteworthy conclusion of this thesis is that public tolerance of gun-carry 
programs is impacted by semantics and perception. The importance of context in gun-carry 
conversations cannot be overstated. The long-term success and sustainability of 
Sunnyvale’s DPS model has prompted a surge of interest in the framework. Research 
conducted here notes that the overwhelming majority of objections to the DPS model 
revolve around various fiscal interests, logistical concerns, training obstacles, and frictions 
over police and fire unions’ conflicting interests. Interestingly, minimal political or public 
outrage exists over placing firearms in the hands of DPS employees. When arming 
firefighters, organizations should consider that a change in agency title could facilitate 
acceptance of firearms carriage models. Historically, DPS administrations experience far 
less friction than fire departments do when adopting gun-carry policies. 
Today, fire service members maintain an essential role in the homeland security 
enterprise. The protection of life and property from fire, prehospital emergency medical 
care, and hazmat detection and mitigation are just a few of the most common threats 
addressed by fire departments across the United States. Whether the U.S. public needs or 
even wants fire service members to expand their homeland security mission by taking up 
firearms remains undecided.  
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This research confirms that arming firefighters is a byzantine problem. The 
establishment of gun-carry-programs offers additional security for citizens and for the 
firefighters tasked with safeguarding them; but at what cost? Due to the complexity of this 
debate, the search for one ideal gun-carry model continues.  
In closing, it is vital for those who oppose fire sector gun carriage to acknowledge 
that many fire agencies have already adopted firearms. It remains likely that more fire 
departments will follow suit. In the future, constructive conversations should revolve 
around how to employ the safest and most effective weapons tactics rather than continuing 
to debate whether weapons are needed. As the saying goes, in many fire jurisdictions, the 
genie is already out of the bottle. Despite philosophical or ethical objections to weapons, 
opponents of these programs should still contribute to the conversations that precede and 
follow their creation. All citizens should participate in such polarizing debates as they are 
reflections of our nation’s democratic ethos. Through public discourse, we can continue to 
address the myriad, ever-evolving homeland security threats. 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The practice of carrying firearms is a relatively new undertaking for many fire 
sector agencies. Therefore, data related to firearm safety, usage, and efficacy is currently 
either limited or non-existent. Future research in this area should include emerging data 
related to firearms program planning, implementation, and maintenance within the fire 
sector. This comparative analysis of various fire organizations could be vastly improved 
through the addition of hard data.  
Although the research would amount to a herculean undertaking, it would be 
invaluable to know precisely how many of the nearly 30,000 U.S. fire departments are 
using firearms carry models at any particular time. An inventory of those armed agencies 
would allow for the sharing of best practices across jurisdictions. Moreover, it would allow 
for more accurate data collection from those practicing agencies and simplify the 
comparative process.  
This thesis briefly touched upon the somewhat vague costs of gun programs 
associated with accidental discharges and unauthorized uses of force. Municipalities are 
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typically required to pay out large sums of money for those occasional weapons mishaps. 
Decision-makers could benefit greatly from having more accurate payout numbers. 
Expensive litigation could lead to severe disruption of services or even rend in ruin for 
cash-strapped departments. Therefore, future research should approximate a “real dollar” 
risk estimate on gun-carry models. 
Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act (LEOSA) legislation is a national gun policy 
that has been in play for more than 15 years. Future studies of fire sector gun models might 
include lessons learned from LEOSA legislation. A more in-depth examination of 
LEOSA’s benefits and shortcomings could provide important context for stakeholders. 
Since public safety and emergency response to violent incidents are relevant to both police 
and fire agencies, policymakers should consider whether or not LEOSA strategies could 
be transferable to firefighters. Presently, the longevity of LEOSA indicates that national 
gun policies in the fire service might be created and sustained.   
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